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FEATURE ARTICLES
Illinois Brick: A Look Back and A Look
Ahead
By Edward D. Cavanagh*

I. Introduction
In June 1977, the United States Supreme Court decided
Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, ruling that only those dealing directly
with price-fixers, and not others in the chain of distribution, are
"injured" within the meaning of Section 4 of the Clayton Act in
price-fixing cases.' The decision struck the death knell to claims by
indirect purchasers that illegal overcharges incurred by first
purchasers had been passed-on to them through the distribution
chain. 2 The so-called direct purchaser rule of Illinois Brick was clear
and unequivocal, the very essence of a bright-line rule. Yet, after over
a quarter century, the decision remains controversial. Opponents of
Illinois Brick have been both resourceful and persistent. While these
opponents have failed in their efforts to see Illinois Brick repealed in
Congress or directly overturned by the Supreme Court,3 they have
* Professor of Law, St. John's University. A.B., University of Notre Dame; J.D.,
Cornell Law School; LL.M., J.S.D., Columbia Law School. The author gratefully
acknowledges the very helpful comments of Professor Joseph Bauer and the faculty
at Notre Dame Law School to whom an earlier version of this paper was presented
as a work-in-progress.
1 Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
2 In re Microsoft Corp. Antitrust Litig., 127 F. Supp. 2d 702, 712 (D. Md.
2001) (stating that Illinois Brick assumes that direct purchasers were overcharged
and "[t]his is the death knell to plaintiffs' claims since the very purpose of the
Illinois Brick rule is to prevent indirect purchasers, such as plaintiffs, from
receiving any portion of a passed-though overcharge.").
3 See Kansas v. Utilicorp United, Inc., 497 U.S. 199, 217 (1990) (reaffirming
Illinois Brick, explaining that "[h]aving stated the rule in Hanover Shoe, and
adhered to it in Illinois Brick, we stand by our interpretation of § 4.").
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effectively undermined Illinois Brick through statutory repealers
under state law 4 and through the Supreme Court decision in
California v. ARC America Corp.5 ARC America held that Illinois
Brick neither preempts states from enacting indirect purchaser
statutes nor does it bar the federal courts from entertaining state law
indirect purchaser claims. 6 As a direct result of ARC America, federal
courts now regularly entertain, through removal or supplemental
jurisdiction, issues involving passing-on under state law, which they
are precluded from hearing under federal law by Illinois Brick.
Illinois Brick continues to inspire passionate arguments in the

Some thirty states permit indirect purchaser suits. Twenty-five states and the
District of Columbia have enacted Illinois Brick repealer statutes. See ALA. CODE
§ 6-5-60(a) (2004); ARiz REV. STAT. § 44-1408(B) (2004); CAL. Bus. & PROF.
CODE § 16750(a) (West 2004); COLO. REV. STAT. § 6-4-111(2) (2004) (authorizing
the state attorney general to bring suit for indirect injury to any government or
public entity); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. D(6), § 2108 (2004); D.C. CODE ANN.
§ 28-4509(a) (2004); HAW. REV. STAT. (Michie 2003) (allowing the state attorney
general to file class action suit on behalf of indirect purchasers); IDAHO CODE § 48108(2) (Michie 2004) (permitting the state attorney general as parens patriae to
bring suit); 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 10/7(2) (2004); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-161(b) (
20032); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. fit. 10, § 1104(1) (West 2004); MD. CODE ANN.,
COM. LAW I § 11-209(b)(ii) (2002) (allowing the state and its subdivisions to bring
indirect purchaser suits); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 445.778(2) (2004); MINN. STAT.
§ 325D.57 (2003); MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-21-9 (2000); NEB. REV. STAT. § 59-821
(Supp. 2002); NEV. REV. STAT. 598A.210(2) (Supp. 2001); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 57-1-3(A) (Michie 2000); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 340(6) (McKinney Supp.
2003); N.D. CENT. CODE § 51-08.1-08(3) (2004); OR. REV. STAT. § 646.775(l)(a)
(2001) (allowing attorney general to sue on behalf of indirect purchasers); R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 6-36-12(g) (2001) (attorney general may sue on behalf of indirect
purchasers); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 370-1-33 (Michie 2004); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9,
§ 2465(b) (Supp. 2002); Wis. STAT. § 133.18(1)(a) (2001).
4

Iowa, North Carolina, and Tennessee permit indirect purchaser suits by judicial
decision. See Comes v. Microsoft Corp., 646 N.W.2d 440, 451 (Iowa 2002); Hyde
v. Abbot Labs., Inc., 123 N.C. App. 572, 473 S.E.2d 680, 6848 (N.C. Ct. App.
1996); Blake v. Abbott Laboratories, Inc., No. 03A01-9509-CV-00307, 1996 Tenn.
App. LEXIS 184, at *34, 1996-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 71, 369 at 76,854 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 1996).
Florida permits indirect purchaser suits under its consumer protection statute. See
Mack v. Bristol- Meyers Squibb Co., 673 So. 2d 100 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
See generally 1 ABA SECTION
AND

OF ANTITRUST LAW, STATE ANTITRUST PRACTICE

STATUTE 19 n.139 (3d ed. 2004).
5 California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93 (1989).
6

Id. at 101-02.

7 See, e.g., In re Vitamins Antitrust Litig., 320 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2004).
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antitrust community with debaters both for and against the Illinois8
Brick rule asserting their views with near religious fervor.
Unfortunately, that fervor has had the side-effect of clouding the
underlying issues and promoting policy choices that may not be
grounded in real-world experience. This article will: (1) review the
Illinois Brick decision and its impact on the evolution of antitrust
doctrine; (2) analyze the rule of Illinois Brick in light of a variety of
policy considerations to determine the soundness of the rule; (3)
review the judicial experience in indirect purchase suits in the postARC America era to ascertain whether any change in the direct
purchaser rule is warranted; and (4) discuss the implications of
Illinois Brick in answering the broader question of the proper role of
state regulators and state law in the overall antitrust enforcement
picture.

II. Background: The Direct Purchaser Rule
A. Hanover Shoe
It is impossible to grasp the philosophical underpinnings of
the Illinois Brick decision without an in-depth understanding of the
Supreme Court's earlier decision in Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United
Shoe Machine Corp.9 Hanover Shoe was a treble damages action for
The positions supporting and in opposition to Illinois Brick are so unyielding
that panelists speaking at the ABA Antitrust Section's annual Antitrust Remedies
Forum in spring 2003 in Washington, D.C. agreed not to discuss Illinois Brick,
fearing that debate of indirect purchaser suits would de facto preempt debate on all
other antitrust remedies issues. Over the years, however, the ABA Antitrust Section
has debated the issue extensively. See ABA Section of Antitrust Law, The State of
FederalEnforcement Report of the Task Force on FederalAntitrustAgencies 22, at
24
(Jan.
2001),
available
at
http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/transition/transitionreporto1.pdf (last visited Nov.
2, 2004); ABA Section of Antitrust Law, Report of the Indirect Purchaser Task
Force, 63 ANTITRUST L.J. 993 (1995); ARC America Task Force, American Bar
Association, Report of the ABA Section of Antitrust Law Task Force to Review the
Supreme Court's Decision in California v. ARC American Corp., 59 ANTITRUST
L.J. 273 (1990); ABA Section of Antitrust Law, Legislative Issues and Judicial
Developments: Report of the American Bar Association Section of Antitrust Law
Task Force to Review Proposed Legislation to Repeal or Modify Illinois Brick, 52
ANTITRUST L.J. 841 (1984); Illinois Brick Task Force, ABA, Report of the
American Bar Association Antitrust Law Section Task Force on Legislative
Alternatives Concerning Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 46 ANTITRUST L.J. 1137
(1978).
8

9 Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481 (1968).
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monopolistic overcharges against defendant shoe machinery
manufacturer brought by plaintiff shoe-manufacturer, which had
leased shoe machinery from defendant. 10 Plaintiff alleged that
defendant's business practices, particularly its "lease only" policy
with respect to shoe machinery that prohibited plaintiff from
1
purchasing such machinery, violated Section 2 of the Sherman Act,
thereby causing the plaintiff to pay far more in rent under the lease
agreement than it would have had to pay were it if permitted to
purchase the equipment.12 The Court rejected defendant's contention
that plaintiff had suffered no legally cognizable damages because it
has "passed-on" any overcharges by simply increasing the price of
shoes sold to its customers and found for the plaintiff, holding that,
except in very limited circumstances, a 13direct purchaser is injured by
the full amount of any overcharge paid.
On a visceral level, the HanoverShoe holding is fairly easy to
comprehend. Defendant, having been held liable for monopolization,
argued that it should not have to pay treble damages to customers
who actually paid the monopolistic overcharges because those14
customers did not ultimately bear the burden of those overcharges.
The defense position was counterintuitive. Given that the defendant
had violated the antitrust laws and had caused its customers to pay
overcharges, the antitrust violation was complete.' 5 The business
decisions that the first purchasers made after incurring the illegal
overcharge are, from a legal perspective, irrelevant. 16 As the Court in
Hanover Shoe noted, "[a]s long as the seller continues to charge the17
illegal price, he takes from the buyer more than the law allows."'
The rationale underlying the rejection of the "passing-on" defense
was the Court's concern that recognizing this defense would impair
the deterrent function of treble damages actions because the ultimate
'0 Hanover Shoe, 392 U.S. at 483. The Hanover Shoe treble damages action
arose out of a government injunctive action entitled United States v. United Shoe
Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953), aff'd per curiam 347 U.S. 521
(1954), which resulted in judgment for the government.
" 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2004).
12 Hanover Shoe, 392 U.S. at 483.
13 Id. at 487-88.
14
15

Id. at 488.
Id. at 489.

16 Id.

17

Hanover Shoe, 392 U.S. at 489.
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consumers, who, defendants say, bear the brunt of any overcharge,
would have only a tiny stake in any litigation and thus no incentive to
sue. 18 In addition, the Court was concerned about the practical pitfalls
in analyzing business decisions in the "real economic world" rather
than in an economist's hypothetical [econometric] model."' 9 The
Court stated:
We are not impressed with the argument that sound laws of
economics require recognizing this [passing-on] defense. A
wide range of factors influence a company's pricing
policies. Normally the impact of a single change in the
relevant conditions cannot be measured after the fact;
indeed a businessman may be unable to state whether, had
one fact been different (a single supply less expensive,
general economic conditions more buoyant, or the labor
market tighter, for example), he would have chosen a
different price. Equally difficult to determine, in the real
economic world rather than an economist's hypothetical
model, is what effect a change in a company's price will
have on its total sales. Finally, costs per unit for a different
volume of total sales are hard to estimate. Even if it could
be shown that the buyer raised his price in response to, and
in the amount of, the overcharge and that his margin of
profit and total sales had not thereafter declined, there
would remain the nearly insuperable difficulty of
demonstrating that the particular plaintiff could not or
would not have raised his prices absent the overcharge or
maintained the higher price had the overcharge been
discontinued. Since establishing the applicability of the
passing-on defense would require a convincing showing of
each of these virtually unascertainable figures, the task
20
would normally prove insurmountable.
8 Id. at 494.
19

Id. at 492.

20

Id. at 492-93 (emphasis added). The Court thus identified several key

factors which made measurement of "passed-on" overcharges highly speculative, if
not impossible:
1. Bases for pricing decisions
In making pricing decisions, a businessman looks at many parameters
in addition to the cost of a single source of supply. Id. Hence, a shoe
manufacturer would probably take into account a number of factors
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besides the rental cost of a shoe machine, including cost of building
rental, labor costs, materials acquisition costs, transportation costs,
availability and cost of credit, prices charged by competitors for
comparable shoes, and expectations as to future demand, inflation and
general employment levels. A change in any of these factors is likely to
have an impact on pricing decisions by the shoe manufacturer (and in
these inflationary times would no doubt result in an increase in the
price of shoes). Thus, the notion inherent in the pass-on defense that
any overcharge incurred by a customer can readily be traced and
isolated in the price that such a customer charges his customers is
fallacious.
2. Impact of price increases
In the real world, it is difficult to measure with any accuracy the effect
on total sales of any price increase imposed by the overcharged
purchaser to his buyers. Id. at 493. Economists measure a buyer's
sensitivity to price changes by elasticity analysis. If a buyer is sensitive
to price changes in a product, i.e., will reduce his volume of purchases
when prices increase, his demand is said to be relatively elastic.
Sophisticated econometric models can de devised to measure a buyer's
demand elasticity and provide an estimate of how much of an
increment an overcharged purchaser can pass-on to his buyer without
affecting sales volume. Such a model could also theoretically measure
the decline in sales the overcharged purchaser could expect to suffer
were he to pass-on 100% of any overcharge.
Such econometric models, however, are expensive to devise, difficult
to fully comprehend and at best only "guesstimators." Introduction of
such econometric analysis into evidence would surely complicate and
possibly unduly obfuscate antitrust proceedings. Moreover, such
devices may be totally irrelevant in measuring change in sales volume.
A buyer may choose to reduce volume of purchases from the
overcharged purchaser for reasons that have nothing to do with
increases in acquisition costs. For example, the buyer may have or
perceive a change in taste; the buyer may be retrenching its sale efforts
because of recession-induced economic conditions. There are any
number of possible reasons for a decline in sales volume, none of
which is easy to pinpoint.
3. Ascertaining "but for" conduct
Were the alleged conspirator able to show that the first purchaser
passes on 100% of any overcharge to its customers and such customers
suffered no loss in total sales or profit margin (a showing, which, as
demonstrated above, is at the very least unlikely), the defendant would
find it nearly impossible to prove that but for the overcharge the first
purchaser "could not" or "would not" have raised its prices or
maintained supra-competitive prices had the alleged overcharges
ceased. Id.
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understanding Hanover Shoe and its offspring, Illinois Brick. Of
course, any number of factors other than increased acquisition costs
for a product caused by defendant's illegal overcharges could have
prompted the first purchaser to increase the product's price. 2' For
example, the first purchaser might raise its prices because of an
increase in rent or a more expensive labor agreement or simply
because it felt that the time was right to impose a price increase. The
timing of the defendant's price rise may have been fortuitous.
Moreover, the fact that the first purchaser's price rise follows the

imposition of illegal overcharges does not establish that the first
purchaser was not damaged by those overcharges. 22 It is quite
possible that the higher price to the ultimate purchaser could have
been charged long before its actual imposition. Hence, a mere
showing that the first purchaser's price increase to its customer
follows defendant's overcharge is not enough to prove injury.
Defendant must prove that the first purchaser "could not" or "would
not" maintain a given price absent any overcharge imposed by the
antitrust violation;23 that burden cannot be sustained in the "real
economic world.,
B. Post-HanoverShoe, Pre-IllinoisBrick Decisions Regarding

Passing-on
Hanover Shoe held that a party may not defend a price-fixing
charge by claiming that the plaintiff passed-on any overcharges to its
customers, or, more simply, passing-on may not be used
defensively.24 Hanover Shoe, however, did not address the question
21

Id. at 492 n.9.

22

As the court in HanoverShoe further noted:
The mere fact that a price rise followed an unlawful cost increase does
not show that the sufferer of the cost increase was undamaged. His
customers may have been ripe for his price rise earlier; if a cost rise is
merely the occasion for a price increase a businessman could have
imposed absent the rise in his costs, the fact that he was earlier not
enjoying the benefits of the higher price should not permit the supplier
who charges an unlawful price to take those benefits from him without
being liable for damages. This statement merely recognizes the usual
principle that the possessor of a right can recover for its unlawful
deprivation whether or not he was previously exercising it.

Id. at 493 n.9.
23

Id.

24 Id. at 491-92. This ruling is in line with prior Supreme Court holdings

Loyola Consumer Law Review

[Vol. 17:1

of whether a plaintiff down the distribution line could claim that
overcharges had been passed-on to the plaintiff, thereby causing
antitrust injury; i.e., whether passing-on could be used offensively.
The majority of lower courts upheld the offensive use of passingon, 26 although a few held, as the Supreme Court would eventually
rule in Illinois Brick, that the logic of Hanover Shoe prohibited the
offensive as well as defensive use of passing-on. 27 However, a great
deal of confusion existed as to the legal basis for granting or denying
offensive use of the passing-on doctrine. Courts and commentators
wherein plaintiffs had indirect claims. See, e.g., S. Pac. Co. v. Damell-Taenzer
Lumber Co., 245 U.S. 531, 533 (1918) ("The general tendency of the law, in regard
to damages at least, is not to go beyond the first step.").
25 There are several obvious distinctions between the Hanover Shoe doctrine
and the offensive use of passing-on. Hanover Shoe was a pro-plaintiff decision; to
permit the defensive use of passing-on would serve to frustrate antitrust
enforcement. Allowing the offensive use of passing-on would arguably promote
antitrust enforcement. Secondly, the result in Hanover Shoe was designed to
prevent antitrust defendants from gaining a windfall. Permitting the offensive use
of passing-on would arguably prevent first purchasers who passed-on overcharges
from gaining a similar windfall. West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 440 F.2d
1079, 1088 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied sub nom. Coder Drugs, Inc. v. Chas. Pfizer
& Co., 404 U.S. 871 (1971).
16 Before Illinois Brick, six of the seven federal circuit
courts ruling on the
issue held that indirect purchasers could sue for damages caused by violations of
the federal antitrust laws. See Illinois v. Ampress Brick Co., 536 F.2d 1163 (7th
Cir. 1976), rev'd sub nom. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, (1977);
Yoder Bros., Inc. v. Cal.-Fla. Plant Corp., 537 F.2d 1347 (5th Cir. 1976); In re W.
Liquid Asphalt Cases, 487 F.2d 191 (9th Cir. 1973); Illinois v. Bristol-Myers Co.,
152 U.S. App. D.C. 367, 470 F.2d 1276 (D.C. Cir. 1972); West Virginia v. Chas.
Pfizer & Co., 440 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir. 1971); Mangano v. Am. Radiator & Standard
Sanitary Corp., 438 F.2d 1187 (3d Cir. 1971) (upholding dismissal of indirect
purchaser claim); S.C. Council of Milk Producers, Inc. v. Newton, 360 F.2d 414
(4th Cir. 1966).
27 Donson Stores, Inc. v. Am. Bakeries Co., 58 F.R.D. 481 (S.D.N.Y. 1973);
Philadelphia Hous. Auth. v. Am. Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 50 F.R.D. 13
(E.D. Pa. 1970), aff'd per curiam sub nom. Mangano v. Am. Radiator & Standard
Sanitary Corp., 483 F.2d 1187 (3d Cir. 1971); City and County of Denver v. Am.
Oil Co., 53 F.R.D. 620 (D. Colo. 1971).
28 Boshes v. Gen. Motors Corp., 59 F.R.D. 589 (N.D. Ill. 1973); In re

Antibiotics Antitrust Actions, 333 F. Supp. 313 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Wilson v.
Ringsby Truck Lines, Inc., 320 F. Supp 699 (D. Colo. 1970); see Daniel Berger &
Roger Bernstein, An Analytical Frameworkfor Antitrust Standing, 86 YALE L.J.
809 (1977); Milton Handler & Michael Blechman, Antitrust and Consumer
Interest, The Fallacy of the Parens PatriaeApproach, 85 YALE L.J. 626, 638-48
(1976); Comment, Standing to Sue in Antitrust Cases: The Offensive Use of
Passing-On, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 976, 977-79 (1975); Comment, Mangano and
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discussed the31issue in terms of "standing,, 29 "remoteness" 30 and
"passing-on." It was thus left to the Supreme Court to clear the air.

C. Illinois Brick
1. The Illinois Brick Rule
In Illinois Brick, the Supreme Court was asked to determine
which group of purchasers at different levels in the same vertical
chain of distribution-those purchasing directly from defendants
("direct purchasers") and the customers of such purchasers ("indirect
purchasers")-had a claim for overcharges in a treble damages action
arising out of an alleged price-fixing conspiracy by manufacturers of
32
concrete blocks in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.
Plaintiffs, various state and local government entities, admittedly did
not deal directly with the defendants but rather purchased buildings
into which the price-fixed concrete blocks had been incorporated.
Plaintiffs claimed that the overcharges imposed by the concrete block
manufacturers had been passed-on to them by intervening parties in
the chain of distribution and that they had therefore suffered "injury"
Ultimate Consumer Standing: The Misuse of the Hanover Doctrine, 72 COLUM. L.

REv. 394 (1972).
29

Illinois v. Ampress Brick Co., 67 F.R.D. 461, 467-68, (N.D. Ill. 1975),

rev'd, 536 F.2d 1163, 1164-67 (7th Cir. 1976); In re W. Liquid Asphalt Cases, 487
F.2d 191 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 919 (1974); In re Master Key
Antitrust Litig., 1973 Trade Cas. (CCH) 74,680 (D. Conn. 1973).
30 See In re Antibiotics Antitrust Actions, 333 F. Supp. 310, 312-13 (S.D.N.Y.
1971) (holding that purchasers of animal feed into which alleged priced fixed
antibiotics had been incorporated were too remote to sue manufacturers of such
antibiotics); see also Boshes v. Gen. Motors Corp., 59 F.R.D. 589 (N.D. 111. 1973).
3' Hanover Shoe, 392 U.S. at 489.
32 Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 726-27. The rule of Illinois Brick applies only in
treble damages actions and does not apply to actions for injunctions pursuant to
§ 16 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 26. See Campos v. Ticketmaster, 140 F.3d
1166, 1172 (8th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1102 (1999) (upholding
dismissal of indirect purchasers claim for monetary damages under § 4 of the
Clayton Act); In re Chicken Antitrust Litig. Am. Poultry, 669 F.2d 228, 238 (5th
Cir. 1982); Mid-West Paper Products Co. v. Cont'l Group, Inc., 596 F.2d 573,
589-94 (3d Cir. 1979).
33 Blocks were purchased from defendants by masonry contractors and used to
build masonry structures; those structures were incorporated into entire buildings
by general contractors and then sold to, among others, governmental entities.
Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 726.

Loyola Consumer Law Review

[Vol. 17:1

under Section 4 of the Clayton Act. 34 Defendants
moved for
35
summary judgment on the authority of Hanover Shoe.
The Court was thus confronted with the question of whether
to reaffirm the principles of Hanover Shoe and hold that only the
overcharged direct purchaser-as opposed to the indirect purchasers
down the distribution line-should be deemed to have suffered the
full injury from the alleged overcharge. Alternatively, the Court
could modify Hanover Shoe and permit multiple claims to the same
overcharge by plaintiffs at different points in the chain of distribution
who can show passing-on. 36 The Court, by a 6-3 vote, again chose to
concentrate the full amount of any overcharge in the hands of the first
purchaser, stating "that the overcharged direct purchaser, and not
others in the chain of manufacture and or distribution, is the party
'injured in his business or property' within the meaning of [Section 4
of the Clayton Act]. ' The majority thus adopted a rule of symmetry
regarding the offensive use of passing-on, thereby barring indirect
purchasers from maintaining treble damages actions whenever the
antitrust defendant would be precluded from asserting the passing-on
defense against a direct purchaser. 38 The Court discussed at length
the policy reasons underlying the rule of symmetry in Illinois Brick.39

15 U.S.C. § 15 (2004); Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 726.
Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 726.

34
35
36

Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 728-29.

37

Id. at 729.

38 Id.

The pros and cons of the Illinois Brick ruling barring plaintiffs' use of the
passing-on theory have been debated at length in the literature, e.g., William
Landes & Richard Posner, Should Indirect PurchasersHave Standing to Sue Under
39

the Antitrust Laws? An Economic Analysis of Illinois Brick, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 602
(1979) (generally supporting the Illinois Brick holding); cf Robert G. Harris &
Lawrence A. Sullivan, Passing On the Monopoly Overcharge: A Comprehensive

Policy Analysis, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 269 (1979) (criticizing the rule of Illinois
Brick). See William Landes & Richard Posner, The Economics of Passing On: A

Reply to Harrisand Sullivan, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 1274 (1980); Robert G. Harris &
Lawrence A. Sullivan, Passing on the Monopoly Overcharge: A Response to

Landes and Posner, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 1280 (1980). That debate will not be
rekindled here, except to note that even the most forceful opponents of the Illinois
Brick holding fail to come to grips with a basic tenet of that ruling: proof of
passing-on requires a number of assumptions which cannot be easily or accurately
translated from the economist's hypothetical model to the real economic world.
See, e.g., Harris & Sullivan, Passing on the Monopoly Overcharge, supra, at

277-79.
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a. Tracing Problems
The Court found that any attempt to trace complex economic
adjustments to a change in the cost of a particular factor of
production would greatly complicate already complex antitrust
proceedings and bog the Court down with numerous side issues that
did not go to the heart of the alleged misconduct. 40 The Court further
reasoned that evidentiary complexities which were identified in
Hanover Shoe (where passing-on was used as a defense) would be
present where a plaintiff, several steps removed from the defendant
price-fixer in the chain of distribution, sought to use passing-on
offensively.a'
b. Impairment of the Treble Damages Remedy
The Court feared that the introduction of complex tracing
problems into antitrust litigation would reduce the effectiveness of
treble damages actions as a tool for enforcing the antitrust laws. 42
Indirect purchasers, with a comparatively small monetary interest in
the litigation, have far less incentive to sue than the direct purchasers,
who are not only spared the burden of tracing overcharges but are
also permitted 43to recover the full amount of any overcharge under
Hanover Shoe.
c. Risks of Multiple Liability and Inconsistent
Judgments
The Court further noted that any departure from Hanover
Shoe to permit the offensive use of passing-on would create "a
4o

Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 725, 736.

41

Id. at 740 n.3.

42

Id. at 731 n. 12. Justice White wrote for the majority:
The concern in Hanover Shoe for the complexity that would be
introduced into treble-damages suits if pass-on theories were permitted
was closely related to the Court's concern for the reduction in the
effectiveness of those suits if brought by indirect purchasers with a
smaller stake in the outcome than that of direct purchasers suing for the
full amount of the overcharge ...The combination of increasing the
costs and diffusing the benefits of bringing a treble-damages action
could seriously impair this important weapon of antitrust enforcement.

Id. at 745.
41 Id. at 745-46.
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serious risk of multiple liability and 'open the door' to duplicative
recoveries. ' '44 Under Hanover Shoe, the direct purchaser would
automatically recover the full amount of any overcharge it had
passed-on; allowing offensive use of passing-on would enable
indirect purchasers to sue for recovery of all or part of the same
amount, and thereby expose defendants to multiple liability in an
amount that could be far in excess of any ill-gotten gains obtained
through price-fixing.45 Moreover, permitting offensive but not
defensive use of passing-on would inevitably give rise to inconsistent
judgments.46 Thus, one court might find for the defendants in a direct
purchaser suit believing that the defendants committed no illegal acts.
In a subsequent suit, however, another court might alternatively find
for the plaintiffs in a case brought by indirect purchasers against the
same defendants on parallel
facts where the jurisdiction was not
47
bound by the previous suit.
2. Exceptions to the Illinois Brick Rule Barring Indirect
Purchasers From Maintaining Treble Damages Claims
In Illinois Brick, the Supreme Court recognized that complex
tracing problems and the possibility of duplicative recoveries did not
always present insurmountable obstacles to recovery.48 In two very
narrowly defined circumstances, the Court found that a plaintiff who
did not purchase directly from the alleged antitrust violator might be
able to prove that overcharges were passed-on to it without the
necessity of analyzing complex price-output decisions and relative
elasticities in two situations: (1) where there is a pre-existing costplus contract between the first purchaser and its customer,49 and (2)

44

Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 730-31.

41

Id. at 730-31.
Id. at 737 n. 18.

46

4' The injustice of inconsistent verdicts would be further compounded by the
fact that other indirect purchasers, not parties to either suit against the defendants,
may then under the doctrine of collateral estoppel be able to avail themselves of
favorable factual findings in the prior proceeding, effectively estopping defendants
from re-litigating liability. See, e.g., GAF Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 519 F.
Supp. 1203, 1209-18 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (holding that the defendant was estopped
from re-litigating the issue of liability when it had fairly litigated and lost the claim
on the merits in a prior proceeding against a different plaintiff).
48 Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 736 n.16.
49 Id. The same exception was recognized by the Court in Hanover Shoe in
the
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where the first purchaser is owned or controlled by its customer.5 °
a. The "Pre-Existing Cost-Plus Contract" Exception
The problem of tracing does not arise in the situation where a
"pre-existing cost-plus contract,",5 1 which fixes the quantities to be
purchased in advance, exists between the first purchaser and its
customer, the indirect purchaser. As the Court pointed out:
In such a situation, the [first] purchaser is insulated from
any decrease in its sales as a result of attempting to pass-on
the overcharge, because its customer [the indirect
purchaser] is committed to buying a fixed quantity
regardless of price. The effect of the overcharge is
essentially determined in advance, without reference to the
interaction of supply and demand that complicates the
context of the defensive use of passing-on. HanoverShoe, 392 U.S. at 494.
50 Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 736 n.16. While Hanover Shoe was silent on the
application of this exception, it is clear that it pertains equally to defensive and
offensive passing-on situations. See generally Royal Printing Co. v.
Kimberly-Clark Corp., 621 F.2d 323, 325 (9th Cir. 1980); In re Sugar Indus.
Antitrust Litig., 579 F.2d 13, 19 (3d Cir. 1978); In re Coordinated Pretrial
Proceedings In Petroleum Prod. Antitrust Litig., 497 F. Supp. 218, 226 (C.D. Cal.
1980); Dart Drug Corp. v. Coming Glass Works, 480 F. Supp. 1091, 1100 (D. Md.
1979).
51 The Court did not define precisely what was meant by "cost-plus contract."
Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 736. There are essentially two basic methods used in
cost-based pricing: mark-up pricing and cost-plus pricing. See Harris & Sullivan,
Passing on the Monopoly Overcharge, supra note 39, at 303-04. Under mark-up
pricing, widely practiced by wholesalers, the direct cost of a product is its invoice
cost. Id. at 304. The resale price is determined by adding to the invoice cost a more
or less fixed percentage mark-up over the invoice cost, designed to cover indirect
costs and provide a profit. Id. A second type of mark-up pricing, frequently
employed by retailers involves "manufacturer's suggested retail price." Id. at 305.
The seller charges the manufacturer's suggested retail price and the mark-up is the
difference between the suggested resale price and the acquisition cost. Id.
The cost-plus pricing system is most frequently used by manufacturers and
contractors. Id. Unlike mark-up pricing, cost-plus pricing entails a deliberate
cost-allocation process by which the manufacturers determine for each product the
costs associated with the production of one unit of that product. Id. These are
denominated direct costs. Id. Indirect costs are then determined by equal
apportionment among all product lines or in the same ratio as direct costs occur. Id.
The indirect costs may be set in dollar terms or in terms of a percentage of fixed
costs. Id. at 306. In contrast, under a mark-up system, there is no effort to allocate
fixed costs to each product line. Id. at 305.
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determination52 [of the amount of the overcharge] in the
general case.
Thus, the pre-existing cost-plus exception has three elements:

(1) a provision providing for automatic passing-on the
full extent of the overcharge to indirect purchasers;
(2) the direct purchaser is insulated from any decrease
in sales or profit; and
(3) a contract exists which commits the indirect
purchaser to buying a fixed quantity regardless of

price.53
The key element here is the pre-existing,fixed quantity nature
of the contract. 54 In such a situation, the indirect purchaser is locked-

in to buying a set amount and the first purchaser suffers no injury
from any overcharge because he has no loss of sales volume.55 Many
courts talk loosely in terms of the "cost-plus" exception, 56 but it is not
52

Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 736 (emphasis in original).

53 Lefrak v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 487 F. Supp. 808, 819 (S.D.N.Y. 1980);
cf
In re Beef Indus. Antitrust Litig., 542 F. Supp. 1122, 1128-29, 1982-2 Trade Cas.
(CCH) T 64,815 (N.D. Tex. 1982).
54 A simple hypothetical will illustrate the operation of a fixed quantity,
pre-existing cost-plus contract. Assume that the first purchaser (FP) and his
customer, the indirect purchaser (IP), have entered into a pre-existing cost-plus
contract which obligates IP to purchase specified quantities from FP. FP's source of
supply (M) is engaged in a price-fixing conspiracy and pursuant thereto
overcharges FP. The conspiratorial charge to FP by M (FP's acquisition cost) is
$12.00 per unit, while the price that would have prevailed absent a conspiracy was
$10.00 per unit. Under the FP-IP contract, IP must purchase one million units per
year from FP at FP's acquisition cost plus ten percent. The total cost paid by IP
during the conspiracy is $13.2 million; but for the conspiracy IP would have paid
$11 million. In other words, IP pays $2.2 million more than he would have paid but
for the conspiracy. FP on the other hand, is not out of pocket one penny, since
100% of the overcharge is passed-on. FP not only suffers no volume loss but
retains his ten percent profit-margin over costs.
55 This situation is equivalent to perfect inelasticity of demand; the same
amount will be demanded, irrespective of price. Lefrak, 487 F. Supp. at 819.
56 See, e.g., In re Beef Indus. Antitrust Litig., 600 F.2d 1148, 1163 (5th Cir.

1979), cert. denied sub. nom. Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Meat Price Investigators
Assn., 449 U.S. 905 (1980); In re Mid-Atlantic Toyota Antitrust Litig., 516 F.
Supp. 1287, 1292 (D. Md. 1981).
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enough under Illinois Brick to have a cost-plus contract without
having provisions for fixed quantities.5 7
b. The "Ownership or Control" Exception
In addition to the pre-existing "cost-plus" contract situation,
the Court in Illinois Brick suggested a second possible exception to
its general holding barring proof of passing-on, the "ownership or
control" exception. 58 As is the case with the pre-existing "cost-plus"
contract exception, market forces are superseded and complex tracing
issues regarding price-output decisions do not arise because in
situations where the price-fixer owns the first purchasers the "sale"
by the price-fixer to its customer is not at arm's length.5 9 A priceWhere quantities are not contractually fixed in advance, IP may decide
to
decrease its volume of purchases in view of FP's price increase. Should IP reduce
its volume, FP may claim injury based on lost sales. In such a situation, IP cannot
claim to have suffered the full brunt of the overcharge and a detailed assessment of
price/output functions would still be necessary. This, of course, would present
precisely the situation which the Court in Illinois Brick sought to avoid. Illinois
Brick, 431 U.S. at 736; but see HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST
POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE, § 16.6 (2d ed. 1999)
(suggesting that the pre-existing cost-plus contract exception may be crafted too
narrowly).
58 The Court noted that "[a]nother situation in which market forces have been
57

superseded and the pass-on defense might be permitted is where the
direct-purchaser is owned or controlled by its customer." Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at
736 n.16; cf Perkins v. Standard Oil Co., 395 U.S. 642, 648, (1969); In re W.
Liquid Asphalt Cases, 487 F.2d 191, 197, 199 (1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 919
(1974).
59 Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 736. See also Kansas v. Utilicorp
United, Inc.
497 U.S. 199 (1990) (rejecting "regulatory exception" where first purchasers are
public utilities). Subsequent lower court decisions have held that the "control"
exception would apply not only where the direct purchaser is owned or controlled
by its customer but also where it is owned or controlled by its supplier. In re Brand
Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., 123 F.3d 599, 605 (7th Cir. 1997) (citing
Utilicorp, "'where the direct purchaser is owned or controlled by its customer'...
or, we suppose, vice versa"); In re Mid-Atlantic Toyota Antitrust Litig., 516
F. Supp. 1287, 1292 (D. Md. 1981); In re Beef Industry Antitrust Litig., 600 F.2d
1148, 1160-61 (5th Cir. 1979); Jewish Hospital Ass'n, v. Stewart Mech. Enter., Inc.
628 F.2d 971, 974-75 (6th Cir. 1980) cert. denied, 450 U.S. 966 (1981); Reiter v.
Sonotone Corp., 486 F. Supp. 115, 121 n.6 (D. Minn. 1980); Dart Drug Corp. v.
Coming Glass Works, 480 F. Supp. 1091, 1104 (D. Md. 1979); see also Note,
Scaling the Illinois Brick Wall: The Future of Indirect Purchasers in Antitrust
Litigation, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 309, 327 (1978). Scholars have criticized the
Utilicorp holding as taking too narrow a view of the "cost plus" exception. See,
e.g., HOVENKAMP, supra note 57, § 16.6.
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fixer would obviously not benefit from imposing overcharges on an
entity that it owns. Accordingly, the only meaningful way to measure
an overcharge is to look at the price charged by the first purchaser to
its customers. That overcharge can be measured directly without
tracing. Furthermore, the exception is rooted in common sense, for
were it not recognized, the "direct purchaser" rule of Illinois Brick
could be easily
evaded by creating dummy entities as intermediate
60
purchasers.

In creating the "ownership or control" exception to the
general rule of Illinois Brick, the Supreme Court did not elaborate on
precisely what was meant by "ownership or control., 6 ' Nor have the
lower courts developed a definitive test to determine "ownership or
control" in the few cases which have addressed this issue. 62 The
60

See Mid-West Paper Prods. Co. v. Cont'l Group, Inc., 596 F.2d 573, 589

(3d Cir. 1979) ("[T]o bar the purchaser from the subsidiary [of a price-fixer] from
suing on the authority of Illinois Brick 'would invite evasion [of the antitrust laws]
by the simple expedient of inserting a subsidiary between the violator and the first
non-controlled purchaser."' (quoting Stotter v. Amstar, 579 F.2d 13 (3d Cir.
1978))).
61 Dart Drug Corp. v. Coming Glass Works, 480 F. Supp. 1091, 1103 (D. Md.
1979).
62

The lower courts have construed exceptions to Illinois Brick narrowly. See,

e.g., Labrador Inc. v. lams Co., 105 F.3d 665, 666 (9th Cir. 1997); cf In re Brand
Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., 123 F.3d 599, 605-06 (7th Cir. 1997)
(rejecting control exception on the facts). Some clues as to exactly what the
Supreme Court had in mind may be gleaned from the two cases cited in footnote
sixteen. See also Perkins v. Standard Oil Co., 395 U.S. 642, 647-48 (1969)
(involving an action under § 2 of the Clayton Act as amended by the
Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (2004), in which the defendant-supplier
allegedly channeled illegal discounts to competitors of plaintiff through it's sixty
percent owned subsidiary). The Court held that plaintiff's right to recover was not
impeded by the additional formal transactions which occurred prior to reaching the
level of its competitor. Id. at 649. The Ninth Circuit in In re W. Liquid Asphalt
Cases held that suppliers' sales of price-fixed asphalt to indirect purchasers through
contractors whom the asphalt suppliers controlled either by acquisition of stock, or
indirectly through various financial arrangements, including credit, were not
insulated from liability by the holding in Hanover Shoe. In re W. Liquid Asphalt
Cases, 487 F.2d 191, 198-99 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 919 (1974).
Thus, the Supreme Court contemplated that the "ownership or control" exception
apply where (1) the parent subsidiary relationship exists between the seller and
direct purchaser and (2) where the seller is able to exercise de facto dominion over
the direct purchaser, absent ownership of a majority of stock in the direct
purchaser. See, Note, Scaling the Illinois Brick Wall: The Future of Indirect
Purchasers In Antitrust Litigation, 63 CORNELL L. REv. 309, 327 (1977); see
generally William H. Page, The Limits of State Indirect PurchaserSuits: Class
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Supreme Court has, however, resisted 63attempts to create additional
exceptions to the Illinois Brick holding.
D. Illinois Brick in Historical Context
The timing of the Illinois Brick decision is significant. In the
late 1970's, the federal courts, led by the Supreme Court, were
becoming much more defendant-friendly in antitrust cases. Illinois
Brick was handed down only two weeks prior to the landmark
decision in Continental TV., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc. ,64 which held
that vertically imposed territorial restraints should not be condemned
as per se unlawful but rather adjudged under a rule of reason
standard. 65 In so holding, the Court overruled its earlier decision in
United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co.,66 which had condemned a
manufacturer's vertically imposed territorial restraints as per se
unlawful where the manufacturer had departed with "title, dominion
and risk.''67 Thus, under Schwinn, legality turned on the form of the
transaction. GTE Sylvania changed the focus of the inquiry to the
substance of the transaction. Rejecting the per se approach, the Court
found that whether or not a vertically imposed territorial restraint was
lawful turned on an analysis of the pro-competitive benefits of that
restraint and whether, on balance, the pro-competitive benefits
outweighed anticompetitive effects. 68 Citing to the well-spring of
economic literature on vertical non-price restraints that had emerged
both before and in the wake of Schwinn, the Court concluded that it
would be reasonable for a manufacturer to limit intra-brand
competition among its dealers to promote stronger inter-brand
competition
and to avoid free-riding among Sylvania television
69
dealers.
Moreover, the Illinois Brick ruling was rendered only four

Certification in the Shadow of Illinois Brick, 67 ANTITRUST L.J. 1, 1-3 (1999)
("The Supreme Court has rebuffed efforts to create additional exceptions to the rule
[of Illinois Brick].").
63 See Kansas v. Utilicorp United Inc., 497 U.S. 199
(1990).
64 Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1963).
65

Id.

66

United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967).

67

Id. at 379.

68

Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 51-58.

69

Id.
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months after Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc.,70 which
held that a plaintiff in a private treble damages action must establish
"antitrust injury," i.e., the kind of injury that the antitrust laws were
designed to prevent and that "flows from that which makes the
defendant's acts unlawful., 71 The impact of these three decisions was
both striking and immediate. Following Illinois Brick, indirect
purchaser suits virtually evaporated in the federal courts. Dealer
termination suits disappeared in droves in the wake of GTE Sylvania;
and, while these suits cannot fairly be described as extinct, a
successful antitrust suit by a terminated dealer is a rarity today.
Motions to dismiss for failure to establish antitrust injury under
Brunswick became a cottage industry. Antitrust injury continues to be
a point of contention in almost every antitrust action.
Despite the similarity in results in the three cases-each
resulting in judgment for the defendant-they received markedly
different reactions from the antitrust bar and the public. GTE
Sylvania and Brunswick were generally embraced, perhaps
reluctantly in some quarters, as intelligent decisions, even if they did
limit the number of plaintiffs in the antitrust universe.72 Illinois Brick,
on the other hand, generated a firestorm of criticism from the day it
was decided. 73 Opposition was by no means universal-Illinois Brick
had many supporters not only in the defense bar but also among
academics 74 and judges 75-but opposition from the plaintiff's side
70

Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977).

71 Id. at 489.
72 See HOVENKAMP, supra note 57, at

§§ 11.3, 16.3; ROBERT H. BORK, THE

ANTITRUST PARADOX, at 285-99 (1978).
73 See Harris & Sullivan, Passing On the Monopoly Overcharge, supra
note
39; Edmund H. Mantell, Denial of Forum to Indirect Purchaser Victims of Price
Fixing Conspiracies:A Legal and Economic Analysis of Illinois Brick, 2 PACE L.
REv. 153 (1982); William F. Watson, Bad Economics in the Antitrust Courtroom:
Illinois Brick and the Pass On Problem, 9 ANTITRUST L. ECON. REv. 69 (1977).
74 See Page, supra note 61. See also Landes & Posner, An Economic
Analysis
of Illinois Brick, supra note 39; Landes & Posner, A Reply to Harrisand Sullivan,
supra note 39.
75 See, e.g., In re Beef Indus. Antitrust Litig., 1982-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) j 64,
815 (N.D. Tex. 1982) (Higginbotham, J., granting defendants' summary judgment
motion dismissing indirect claims). Judge Higginbotham discussed the Supreme

Court's attempt to reconcile competing interest in this way:
The task of applying the legal doctrine that forbids both offensive and

defensive use of pass-on is presented a second time in this litigation.
The prohibition was born of a familiar tension between finite proof and
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was vocal and intense. Almost overnight, legislation was introduced
in Congress to supercede Illinois Brick.76 That effort, as well as
subsequent lobbying efforts, failed. So, too, did efforts to undo the
direct purchaser rule in the courts.77

Undaunted, Illinois Brick opponents turned to state
legislatures and state courts to challenge Illinois Brick. Here, they
made inroads-some thirty states have statutes or court decisions
permitting antitrust suits by indirect purchasers under state law.78
Indirect purchasers suing in state courts under state law found a
receptive atmosphere. In an effort to contain indirect purchaser suits
brought in state courts, defendants, where possible, sought to (1)
remove the case to federal court, and (2) move to dismiss on the
authority of Illinois Brick.79 Thus, the argument was that Illinois
Brick had preempted state indirect purchasers claims from being
heard in federal courts. 80 The defendants' proceeded using the
following theory: if Illinois Brick held that an indirect purchaser was
not "injured" within the meaning of Section 4 of the Clayton Act due
to (1) the complexity of tracing overcharges through the chain of
distribution, (2) the risk of multiple liability, and (3) impairment of
the deterrent function of the treble damage remedy, then Illinois
Brick must also bar claims asserted under state statutes virtually
identical to the Sherman Act 8 l for the same reasons that federal
convenience and adjusted by the Supreme Court on the side of
convenience. In this task, we are reminded that the relationship of
antitrust law and economic theory continues to be a sometime thing
suffering from both lack of commitment and an inability (or
unwillingness) to communicate, each with the other.
Id. at 1126.
76 H.R. 11942, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978); S. 1874, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1978); H.R. 9132, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); H.R. 8516, 05th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1977), H.R. 8359, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). Similar bills were introduced in
the 96th Congress. H.R. 2004, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979), H.R. 2060, 96th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1979); S. 300, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
For a detailed discussion of the merits of these bills see Edward D. Cavanagh, The
Illinois Brick Dilemma: Is there a Legislative Solution? 48 ALBANY L. REV. 273,
294-307 (1984).
77 See Kansas v. Utilicorp United Inc., 497 U.S. 199, 217 (1990).
78 See supra text accompanying note 4.
79

See California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 97 (1989).

80

See id. at 101-05.

81

See Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 731, 746, 749.
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claims are barred. 82 The Supreme Court, however, was not persuaded
by this line of reasoning. In ARC America,83 it held that under
principles of federalism, the Illinois Brick decision does not bar
federal courts from hearing indirect purchaser claims arising under
state law, even though lower courts in these cases would be required
to perform tasks which the Court had held the federal
courts were not
84
equipped to do under virtually identical federal law.
Why did Illinois Brick generate such passionate opposition
while GTE Sylvania and Brunswick gained quiet acceptance? There is
no simple answer to this question. Opponents of the Illinois Brick
decision criticized the decision and argued that the holding was anticonsumer because it barred from recovery those who bore the brunt
of overcharges in price-fixing cases brought under the Sherman
Act.85 Some critics were concerned that Illinois Brick had thwarted
the will of Congress as expressed in the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust
Improvements Act of 1976 ("Hart-Scott-Rodino") by effectively
barring parens patriae suits. 86 In addition, other critics believed that
Illinois Brick undermined the deterrent function of antitrust law by
holding that direct purchasers experienced 100% of any overcharge
as a matter of law. 87 In their view, direct purchasers would benefit
from cartel behavior by being able to pass-on overcharges
and
8
therefore would have very little incentive to sue price-fixers. 9
Neither GTE Sylvania nor Brunswick generated such negative
visceral reactions. In part, this was due to the fact that GTE Sylvania
and Brunswick were not viewed as overtly hostile to consumers. The
effect of GTE Sylvania was to eliminate many dealer termination
82

See California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. at 99-100.

83

id. at 105-06.

84

Id.

85 S.

Rep. No. 239, 96 Cong., 1st Sess. 6-10 (1979); Antitrust Enforcement

Act of 1979; Hearings on S. 300 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. 69-77 (statements of Messrs. Browning, Scott, Smith, Clark,
Hansen, and White) (hereafter 1979 Senate Hearings).
86 15 U.S.C. § 15c(a)(1) (2004); 1979 Senate Hearings,supra note 85,
at 6077 (statement of Chauncey H. Browning); Restoring Effective Enforcement of the
Anti-Trust Laws: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Monopolies and Commercial

Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 58 (1979)
(statement of William J. Scott).
87 S. Rep. 239, 96th Cong. 1st Sess. 22 (1979); 1979 Senate Hearings, supra
note 85, at 24, 37 (statements of Messrs. Shenefield and Bosworth).
88 Id.
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suits. A number of such suits were garden-variety contract disputes
disguised as antitrust claims having questionable merit. 89 GTE
Sylvania also took a more rational economic approach to vertically
imposed non-price restraints than earlier cases, which had honored
form over substance, by looking at the harm actually caused by such
restraints and then weighing that harm against benefits to the
consumer, instead of simply presuming that the conduct was
unlawful. 90 Similarly, Brunswick was not viewed as anti-consumer
because competitors-not consumers-are the parties most often
forced out of court by the antitrust injury doctrine. - 1 In addition, both
GTE Sylvania and Brunswick embraced sound economic principles
that had overwhelming support in the academic community.
Illinois Brick appears more ambivalent in its approach to
economic evidence. One could argue that Illinois Brick, far from
embracing modern economic thought, was a throwback to earlier
cases where the courts were reluctant to "ramble through the wilds of
economic theory." 93 The Court expressed concern about turning a
courtroom into an economics classroom. 94 Furthermore, the Court
was concerned that trial courts would not be up to the 95complex task
of tracing overcharges through the chain of distribution.
Conversely, one could argue that Illinois Brick is firmly
rooted in economic principles. Judge Frank Easterbrook described
Illinois Brick as an example of a case in which the Supreme Court
"emphasizes efficiency and consumer welfare," thus viewing the case
as an application of cost-benefit analysis, perhaps the most
fundamental exercise of economic principles. 96 This view is bolstered
by the Supreme Court's recent opinion in Verizon Communications.
Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko LLP,97 where Justice Antonin
89

See HOVENKAMP, supra note 59, at § 11.6.

90

See

PHILLIP AREEDA AND & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW,

1643b (2d ed. 2003).
91 Id. at 1337.
92 See, e.g., Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 48 n.13
(1977).
93
94

United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 609-10 n.10 (1972).
Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 741-44.
Id. at 742.

Frank Easterbrook, Workable Antitrust Policy, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1696,
1698 n.7 (1986).
97 Verizon Comm. Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko LLP, 124
S.Ct.
96
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Scalia counseled that the courts should defer to a monopolist's
decision not to deal, lest the courts be forced to act as "central
planners-a role for which they are ill-suited., 98 Justice Scalia further
counseled "against an undue expansion of Section 2 liability [under
the Sherman Act]," noting that the complexities of Section 2 and the
practical limitations on the abilities of courts to fashion effective
remedies are costs that outweigh any marginal benefits of judicial
intervention in refusal to deal cases. Moreover, one can argue that
the Court did not reject economics analysis, as earlier courts had, but
rather considered the proffered economic analysis and concluded that
00
it would not be helpful on the facts of this case.'
Nevertheless, the position that Illinois Brick is nothing more
than a straightforward application of cost/benefit analysis has its
limits. Justice Byron White, the author of the majority opinion in
Illinois Brick, can hardly be viewed as a proponent of "the new
economic thought."''
Indeed, Justice White's opinion in Illinois
Brick is firmly rooted in the Hanover Shoe ruling nearly a decade
earlier. Consistency with prior precedent, not the new economics,
was arguably the bedrock of the opinion. Justice White was also
concerned with the burdens on the courts posed by additional indirect
purchaser suits. 102 He expressed skepticism that any increase in
deterrence could be justified by the added costs of indirect purchaser
suits, while noting potential disincentives of those with relatively
small claims to sue. 03 These are issues that courts have struggled
with for decades. Viewed in this context, Illinois Brick was
evolutionary in nature, while GTE Sylvania and Brunswick were
revolutionary.
The view that Illinois Brick is evolutionary as opposed to
revolutionary is reinforced by recent scholarship delving into the
work of the Supreme Court. Professor Andrew Gavil has undertaken
an extensive examination of the Supreme Court papers of the late
Justice Lewis F. Powell, which are lodged with Washington and Lee
872 (2004).
98 Verizon Comm. Inc., 124 S. Ct. at 879.
Id. at 882.
100 Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 742-43

See, e.g., GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 59 (White, J., concurring) (Justice
White arguing that the Court should have distinguished Schwinn rather than
overruling it).
102 Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 746.
101

103

Id.
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University School of Law. Among other things, Justice Powell's
papers reveal the concerns of several justices that barring indirect
purchasers from suing under the antitrust laws may impair the
compensatory function of antitrust.' 0 4 As discussed above in Part
II.C.1,105 the Court by a vote of 6-3 rejected indirect purchasers as
plaintiffs; but the initial vote in Illinois Brick was 6-3 to permit
indirect purchaser suits.1° 6 It was Justice White, the author of
Hanover Shoe, who eventually swayed the Court to a 6-3 ruling the
other way by emphasizing the doctrine of stare decisis, concerns
about complexity and the need to contain big litigation, as well as the
need to minimize the possibility of multiple liability.' 0 7 It is also clear
that Illinois Brick was not a reactionary decision; the Court
considered, and rejected as unhelpful, economic arguments.

III. Illinois Brick in Action
A. Efforts at Legislative Overruling
1. The Case for Overruling
Before the ink on the Illinois Brick opinion was dry, its
opponents launched a massive lobbying campaign seeking to overrule
the decision legislatively with a disarmingly simple argument: the
holding was at odds with a fundamental principle of antitrust lawcompensation of victims. 0 8 This argument assumed that consumers
were the ultimate victims of price-fixing because some, if not all, of
any illegal overcharge had been passed-on to them. 10 9 The decision
not only failed to compensate the real victims of price-fixing, but it
also gave a windfall to direct purchasers who had passed-on

104

Andrew I. Gavil, Antitrust and the Process of Change in the Supreme

Court: Change in the Supreme Court: Assessing the Powell Papers, Third Annual
Midwest Antitrust Colloquium (April 11, 2003).
105 See supra note 30 and accompanying text. Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 747.
See supra Part II.C. 1.
106 See Gavil, supra note 104.
107

Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 741-47; see Gavil, supra note 104.

108

See 1979 Senate Hearings, supra note 85.

109

Id.
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overcharges through the distribution chain.110 Accordingly, they
argued that Illinois Brick was anti-consumer and failed to protect the
very roup that Congress had in mind in enacting the antitrust
laws.
Second, opponents of Illinois Brick argued that while the
ruling in that case fosters deterrence by assuming that direct
purchasers are in theory entitled to 100% of any overcharge, the
reality is that direct purchasers, whose interests are closely aligned
with their price-fixing sellers, will not sue antitrust violators but will
simply pass-on any overcharges. 12 By excluding indirect purchasers,
the Court eliminated
the only victim of price-fixing with a strong
113
motive to sue.
Third, they argued that Illinois Brick was at odds with
Hart-Scott-Rodino 114 and hence cannot stand." 5 Hart-Scott-Rodino
specifically permitted state attorneys general to sue parenspatriaeon
behalf of natural persons injured by price-fixing.1 16 In enacting HartScott-Rodino, Congress intended to include indirect purchasers as
parties injured within the meaning of Section 4 of the Clayton Act."'
Therefore, the holding in Illinois Brick effectively vitiates Hart-ScottRodino.
Fourth, the parade of horribles predicted by the Court,
assuming indirect purchaser suits were allowed, is overstated.
Concerns about possible multiple liability could be addressed through
existing procedural mechanisms, namely, consolidation for pretrial
purposes before the Judicial Panel for Multi-district Litigation. If all
potential claimants are before the same court, the risk of multiple
liability is minimized, if not eliminated. Moreover, the mere fact that
the task of tracing overcharges through the chain of distribution is
complicated is not sufficient reason to bar indirect purchaser suits.
Antitrust cases regularly present a variety of complicated issues; yet
the courts have not shied away from resolving these issues merely

110

See 1979 Senate Hearings,supra note 85.

I See 1979 Senate Hearings,supra note 85.
112

See id.

113Sd
13See

id.

114

15 U.S.C. § 15(c) (West 2004).

115

See 1979 Senate Hearings,supranote 85.

116

Id.

117

Id.
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because of their complexity. Finally, far from reducing deterrence,
indirect purchaser suits will enhance deterrence by authorizing large
numbers of antitrust victims to sue.
2. The Case Against Overruling
Proponents of Illinois Brick stand by Justice White's
arguments for the majority. Foremost is the concern that overruling
Hanover Shoe and coming to any conclusion other than that reached
in Illinois Brick would impair deterrence by fragmenting potential
plaintiffs' claims, thereby reducing incentives to sue.
Direct
purchasers, who have the greatest incentive to sue and the least
difficulty in proving claims, would have significantly reduced
incentives to sue if Hanover Shoe were overturned because any
recovery would be subject to reduction to the extent passing on down
the distribution chain could be proved. 19 The extent of any reduction
would be unknown ex ante, thus increasing both the uncertainty and
risk of litigation, and minimizing the benefits of the treble damages
remedy. Similarly, from a compensation-injury perspective, it is
difficult to argue that direct purchasers, who have unquestionably
paid overcharges to the defendants, have no claim for relief for those
overcharges from the moment they were incurred because of pricing
decisions they might independently arrive at in the future.
Moreover, the problems of complexity associated with
indirect purchaser claims are real, not imaginary. The process of
tracing overcharges through the distribution chain is inherently
speculative. While it may be possible to reduce complexity through
an array of simplifying assumptions, such as fixed percentage or
fixed dollar mark-ups at each level in the distribution chain, in the
end the answer we get is simply a product of those assumptions
which may bear no relationship to real world business transactions.
The real world rarely confronts the simplified model of seller, first
purchaser, and ultimate consumer. Rather, there are several layers of
intermediaries between the antitrust violator and the ultimate
118

See William H. Page, The Scope of Liability For Antitrust Violations, 37

L. REV. 1445, 1487 (1985) (analyzing Illinois Brick's rejection of the
offensive use of the passing-on theory).
119 Id. at 1489. See generally Landes & Posner, An Economic Analysis of
STAN.

Illinois Brick, supra note 39 (determining that Illinois Brick and Hanover Shoe
together concentrate damages in the hands of the initial purchasers, firms that deal

directly with the manufacturers are apt to know the most about the industry's
behavior and are in the best position to detect cartels, and allowing them to collect
the full overcharge, trebled, creates powerful incentives to investigate and file suit).
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purchaser. Equally important, it is impossible in the real world to
prove that a first purchaser could not or would not have raised prices
paid by its customers, even absent the overcharges imposed on it by
the illegal conspiracy.
Finally, procedural devices currently provided by the Judicial
Panel for Multi-district Litigation and the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, in order to place all claimants and all defendants before
the same trier of fact, are not a panacea. 120 Cases involving multidistrict litigation may be transferred and consolidated for pre-trial for
purposes only; they are then returned to their home districts for
trial. 121 Moreover, federal statutes have no effect on cases proceeding
in state court. Absent major legislation to mandate transfer of federal
and state claims before one federal judge, there is simply no way to
get all interested parties before a single court. Still, such legislation
may not be enough, for there remains the nearly insurmountable
problem of tracing overcharges through the distribution chain.
3. The Congressional Response
Despite the passion ignited by the Illinois Brick ruling,
Congress declined to disturb the Supreme Court holding. A series 1of
22
repealers introduced during the 1977-78 term died in conmmittee.
More narrowly tailored legislation, which would allow state attorneys
general to sue on behalf of indirect purchasers met a similar fate in
1983.123 In the end, opponents of Illinois Brick failed to persuade
legislators that the Supreme Court's ruling was, on balance, bad
antitrust policy.
B. The Rise of State Law Indirect Purchaser Claims
Having been turned away by the federal courts and turned
down by the Congress, indirect purchasers looked to state law and
state courts where the reception to their claims was more hospitable.
As discussed above,124 a number of states responded to Illinois Brick
120

See Cavanagh, supra note 76.

121

Lexecon, Inc. v. Milberg, Weiss, Bershad, Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26,

28 (1998); 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2004).
122

See supra text accompanying note 76; see also supra text accompanying

note 75.
123 Id.
124

See supra text accompanying note 3; see also supra text accompanying
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by enacting statutes expressly authorizing indirect purchaser suits. 125
California, one of the first states to reject Illinois Brick, soon became
a hotbed of indirect purchaser lawsuits under its consumer-friendly
Cartwright Act. 126 Indirect purchasers quickly realized that state
27
courts provided strategic advantages beyond more favorable law.'
For example, because state indirect purchaser claims brought in state
court would be separate from direct purchaser actions in federal
court, it would be impossible for defendants to achieve peace merely
by settling the federal claims. Gone is the "one-size fits all"
settlement. Immune from the pressures of a federal judge to settle the
federal actions, state court plaintiffs could behave strategically to
exact more favorable settlement terms than would be possible if they
were they part of a federal action. Indirect purchasers also perceived
state court judges, who were generally less familiar with antitrust
claims and likely less sophisticated in antitrust analysis than their
federal counterparts, as generally pro-plaintiff, or at least for less
willing than federal judges to grant motions to dismiss or for
summary judgment. Far from eliminating indirect purchaser claims
from the landscape, Illinois Brick simply galvanized state legislatures
and shifted the action in indirect purchaser suits from federal to state
court. 128
Nor did Illinois Brick rid the federal system of indirect
purchaser suits. Indirect purchaser cases brought under state law
began to sneak into the federal system through the back door via
note 4.
125 See id. (showing that the Illinois Brick repealer gave new status to state

attorneys general charged with enforcing state antitrust policy. State enforcer did
not hesitate to wield these newly granted powers. Moreover, as antitrust
enforcement at the federal level waned under the minimalist policies adopted by the
Reagan Administration,, and state attorneys general established an enforcement
network intended to fill in the enforcement void at the federal level. Through the
National Association of Attorneys General ("NAAG"), which allowed states to

conducted joint antitrust investigations, and the prosecution of civil actions.
Although federal antitrust enforcement has been re-energized in subsequent
Administrations, state attorneys general continue to be a force in shaping and
executing policy.).
126 CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 16750(a) (West 1997).
127 See Joel M. Cohen & Trisha Lawson, Navagating Indirect Purchaser

Lawsuits, 15 ANTITRUST 29, 30-31 (2001) (finding that following Illinois Brick,
several states enacted so-called "Illinois Brick repealers," statutes conferring

standing on indirect purchasers [or the state attorney general on their behalf] under
state antitrust law).
128

See id. (commenting on the use of state court indirect purchaser suits).
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removal. Defendants were convinced that federal courts reviewing
indirect purchaser claims arising under state laws virtually identical
to the federal statutes would have no choice but to dismiss, given the
strong policy grounds enunciated by the Supreme Court in Illinois
Brick for avoiding complexity and uncertainty in the federal system
in cases brought under federal law. Defendants argued that the
doctrine of federal preemption barred state law indirect purchaser
claims from being entertained in federal court.
That argument was decisively rejected by the Supreme Court
in ARC America. 129 The Court concluded that federal law did not
occupy the field and that, under principles of federalism, state law
indirect purchaser claims would be upheld even through federal law
did not recognize such claims.1 30 In so holding, the Supreme Court
did not even attempt to explain the apparent contradiction between its
rulings in ARC America and Illinois Brick. In Illinois Brick, the Court
stressed the fact that federal courts are ill-equipped to engage in the
complicated task of tracing overcharges through the distribution
chain and in any event, the end result of such a process is likely to be
speculative.1 3 ' If that were so, then federal courts would appear to be
equally ill-suited to engage in an exercise involving tracing of
overcharges in suits brought under state laws identical to the Clayton
Act. Yet, the Supreme Court held that federal courts could hear state
law indirect purchaser claims.' 3 2 Rather than focusing on the
impracticality and complexity of tracing overcharges as it did in
Illinois Brick, the Court in ARC America hung its hat on
preemption. 133 The Court concluded that Congress did not expressly
preempt state laws allowing indirect purchaser claims. 134 Nor did
state indirect purchaser statutes frustrate the aims of Congress; on the
contrary such state laws are "consistent with the broad purposes of
the antitrust laws."' 35 In the
end, Illinois Brick was simply irrelevant
36
issue.'
preemption
on the

129

ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. at 93.

130

Id. at 103-06.

131
132
133
134

Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 741-44.
ARC Aim Corp., 490 U.S. at 93.
Id. at 101.
Id. at 102.
Id.

136

Id. at 105-06.
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When viewed properly, Illinois Brick was a decision
construing the federal antitrust laws, not a decision defining the
interrelationship between the federal and state antitrust laws. The
congressional purposes on which Illinois Brick was based provide no
support for a finding that state indirect purchaser statutes are preempted by federal law. A more persuasive argument might have been
mounted by defendants on the narrower grounds of abstention. Under
the abstention approach, federal courts would recognize the power to
hear state law indirect purchaser cases under the doctrine of
supplemental jurisdiction but decline to exercise that power because
of conflicts with strong federal policies enumerated in Illinois
Brick.137 The abstention argument still has appeal today; but given
the fact that federal courts regularly entertain state law indirect
purchaser claims in the wake of ARC America and the sky has not
fallen, it would probably not prevail at the end of the day.
C. Indirect Purchaser Suits in the Courts
ARC America re-invigorated enforcement efforts on behalf of
indirect purchasers under state law. Indeed, the ARC America
decision and the Justice Department's aggressive prosecution of
international cartels during the Clinton Administration 138 combined
to make indirect purchaser suits the growth industry of the 1990's in
antitrust. 39 Like the Asbestos suits of the 1980's, these cases were
multi-party, multi-forum and multi-jurisdictional. 14 Plaintiffs, once
eager for federal forums, now flock to state courts, at times shunning
class actions in favor of consolidated suits. 141
This new litigation paradigm is perhaps best exemplified by

137 But see ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. at 101-02 (in enacting the federal

antitrust laws, Congress did not intend to occupy the field).
138 See In re Vitamins Antitrust Litig., 320 F. Supp. 2d 1 (2004) (bringing an
antitrust action against vitamin suppliers alleging broad antitrust conspiracy, and
five suppliers that manufactured vitamin-B4 move for summary judgment on the
issue of conspiracy).
Id.
140

See id. (considering a consolidated action before the Court, which

involved fifty-five separate multiparty lawsuits from thirty-two different federal
courts).
141

See id. (involving well over 100 law firms in the preparation of over

10,000 separate filings).
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the ongoing Vitamins Antitrust Litigation.142 In the wake of a Justice
Department investigation of price-fixing of vitamins and vitamin
products by European manufacturers selling into the United States,
including Hoffman-LaRoche, BASF and Rhone-Poulenc, and
subsequent guilty pleas to felony counts, numerous follow-on treble
damages actions have been commenced in both federal and state
courts. 143 The federal actions were consolidated in the District of
Columbia pursuant to the federal
multi-district litigation
consolidation statute. 44 To date, indirect
purchaser actions have
145
commenced in at least twenty-two states.
This proliferation of litigation of indirect purchaser cases
involving a common nucleus of operative fact with cases pending in
federal court has created a logistical nightmare for the courts. State
court cases are outside the scope of the federal consolidation statute
and therefore cannot be part of any mandatory consolidation for
pretrial purposes. 146 It follows that state court plaintiffs cannot avail
themselves of consolidated discovery in the federal action. Nor is it
possible for the courts of one state to regulate discovery in the courts
of another state.
To a degree, the inefficiencies created by multi-forum
litigation have been ameliorated by efforts of state attorneys general
through the National Association of Attorneys' ("NAAG") to
cooperate on discovery issues. 147 While the benefits of such
cooperation should not be underestimated, voluntary cooperation
does not solve the problem. Voluntary cooperation, though laudable,
is not enforceable by court decree. Equally important, to the extent
private parties as well as states
are involved in the litigation,
48
coordination problems abound. 1
142
143

In re Vitamins Antitrust Litig., 320 F. Supp. 2d 1 (2004).
Vitamins Antitrust Litig., 320 F. Supp. 2d at 6.

144

Id. at 5; 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2004).
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Vitamins Antitrust Litig., 320 F. Supp. 2d at 6.

See 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2004) (stating that civil actions pending in different
jurisdictions may be consolidated for pre-trial proceedings).
147 See id. (showing that the Illinois Brick repealer gave new status to state
attorneys general charged with enforcing state antitrust policy, and state attorneys
general established an enforcement network intended to fill in the enforcement void
at the federal level through the NAAG, which allowed states to conducted joint
antitrust investigations and the prosecution of civil actions).
146
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See Andrew J. Gavil, Federal Judicial Power and Challenges of

Multijurisdictional Direct and Indirect Purchase Antitrust Litigation, 69 GEO.
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Moreover, it is impossible to convene a universal settlement
conference aimed at resolution of all claims pending against the
defendants because all parties are not before the same court. The
inefficiency that results from permitting indirect purchasers suits to
proceed on parallel tracks without any master plan for the conduct of
discovery or for sharing the fruits of discovery is obvious.
Defendants may be forced to waste time and money responding to
duplicative discovery requests. Perhaps more importantly, state court
plaintiffs have strong incentives to engage in strategic behavior
during the course of any settlement discussions. This is especially
likely after federal court claims have been settled.
Knowing that the defendants, having disposed of the federal
claims, are looking to get out from under potential treble damage
liability, the state court plaintiffs can hold out for a better deal. The
added expense of state court indirect purchaser suits and additional
burdens that these suits impose on the civil justice system purchaser
suits are real and of such magnitude as to raise significant doubts as
to whether the benefits achieved by such actions are cost-justified.
Indirect purchasers have enjoyed some success under state antitrust
laws; but, as has been the case with antitrust class actions generally,
most recoveries have come through settlements rather than through
litigated judgments. Still, successful actions can hardly be described
as routine. Indirect purchaser suits face significant obstacles in both
federal and state courts.
1. Federal Court
Even after ARC America, two principal hurdles face indirect
purchaser suits in federal court: subject matter jurisdiction and class
action certification.
a. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
State-based indirect purchaser claims may be heard in federal
court where there is diversity jurisdiction. 149 Diversity jurisdiction
requires not only that the citizenship of all plaintiffs be diverse from
that of all defendants, but also that the amount in controversy exceed
L. REV. 860, 863 (2001) ("Multidistrict litigation, therefore, has become
multijurisdictional, and the procedural means for capturing the efficiencies to be
gained through coordination are far less certain. Achieving procedural efficiency is
left to informal efforts by courts and counsel, not formal means of transfer,
consolidation and coordination.").
149 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2004).
WASH.

Loyola Consumer Law Review

[Vol. 17:1

$75,000.150 Indirect purchaser claims in any given antitrust suit
almost always exceed that amount in the aggregate, but rarely is any
individual claim greater than $75,000. In Zahn v. InternationalPaper
Co., 15 1 the Supreme Court held that in class actions where the basis of
federal subject matter jurisdiction is diversity of citizenship, the
claims of each member of the class must exceed $75,000, i.e., claims
of individual class members cannot be aggregated to meet the
jurisdictional threshold.
Zahn has always been something of a sore spot with
proceduralists because it limits the availability of the federal class
action remedy in suits involving a common nucleus of operative fact
and thereby encourages a proliferation of litigation. 152 Scholars have
questioned the continuing vitality of Zahn1 53 in light of Congressional
expansion of the pendent jurisdiction doctrine in 1990.154 This statute
modestly increased federal subject matter jurisdiction by codifying
the common law doctrines of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction under
the umbrella of supplemental jurisdiction. 55 The statute was intended
to overrule the Supreme Court decision in Finley v. United States and
permit the exercise of federal subject matter jurisdiction in cases
where a given set of facts gives rise to federal claims against one or
more defendants and state law claims against one or more other
defendants. 156 At the same time, Congress made clear that it did not
150

28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2004).

151

Zahn v. Int'l Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291, 294-95 (1973).

152

See, e.g., Stephen D. Kauffman, "Federalizing" Class Actions: The Future

of the JurisdictionalRequirementsfor Diversity-Based Class Actions, 52 ALA. L.
REV. 1029, 1043-44 (2001) (finding that lower federal courts are free to decide
whether Congress intended for § 1367 to implicitly abrogate the Supreme Court's
holding in Zahn); Thomas Merton Woods, Wielding the Sledgehammer: Legislative
Solutions for Class Action Jurisdictional Reform, 75 N.Y.U.L. REV. 507, 541
(2000) (concluding that current practice elevates form over substance, encourages
forum shopping, and prevents consolidation of competing classes).
153 Gavil, supra note 144, at 872 (making the argument for why Zahn is
overruled but noting that this argument is "contrary to the limited legislative history
of the Statute").
154 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2004).
155

28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2004); see

KANE, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS

CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & MARY KAY

§ 19, at 121-23. (6th ed. 2002) (discussing

pendent and ancillary jurisdiction).
156 Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545, 606 (1989) (holding that parties not
otherwise subject to federal jurisdiction could not be sued in federal court when a
co-defendant was being sued under federal law).
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wish to disturb the holding in Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v.
Kroger and limited the operation of supplemental jurisdiction where
plaintiff's original claim is based on diversity jurisdiction and in
those cases involving claims raised by impleader, joinder, and

intervention. 157
The statute, however, was silent regarding class action claims
under Rule 23, leading some to argue that Zahn had been
overruled. 58 The Circuits are divided on the issue; 159 and the
Supreme Court failed to resolve the controversy, affirming by an
equally divided Fifth Circuit decision holding that Congress had
effectively overruled Zahn, 16 and thereby postponed the definitive
resolution of the issue.
b. Class Certification
The class certification procedure is a second stumbling block
to indirect purchaser suits in federal court. As a threshold matter,
"federal appellate courts have viewed class actions governed by the
laws of multiple states with serious skepticism."'' 6 1 MultiOwen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365 (1978) (determining
that a plaintiff may not assert a claim against a third party when there is no
independent basis for federal jurisdiction over that claim).
158 Rosmer v. Pfizer, Inc., 263 F.3d 110, 114-19 (4th Cir. 2001); Gibson v.
Chrysler Corp., 261 F.3d 927, 933-40 (9th Cir. 2001); In re Brand Name
Prescription Drug Antitrust Litig., 123 F.3d 599, 607 (7th Cir. 1997).
159 The following cases upheld the Zahn ruling: Trimble v. Asarco, Inc., 232
F.3d 946, 959-62 (8th Cir. 2000); Meritcare Inc. v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 166
F.3d 214, 218-22 (3d Cir. 1999); Leonhardt v. W. Sugar Co., 160 F.3d 631, 637-41
(10th Cir. 1998).
Zahn was overruled in the following jurisdictions: Free v. Abbott Labs, Inc., 176
F.3d 298, 300-01 (5th Cir. 1999), aff'd by an equally divided Supreme Court, 120
S. Ct. 1578 (2000); Rosmer v. Pfizer Inc., 263 F.3d 110, 114-19 (4th Cir. 2001);
Gibson v. Chrysler Corp., 261 F.3d 927, 933-40 (9th Cir. 2001); In re Brand Name
Prescription Drug Antitrust Litig., 123 F.3d 599, 607 (7th Cir. 1997).
160 Free v. Abbott Labs, Inc., 176 F.3d 298 (5th Cir. 1999), affd, 120 S. Ct.
1578 (2000).
161 In re Relafen Antitrust Litig., 221 F.R.D. 260, 276 (D. Mass. 2004)
(permitting class action certification for claims by indirect purchaser plaintiffs
under the antitrust laws of Arizona, California, Massachusetts and Vermont;
rejecting class action certification for indirect purchaser claims brought under the
antitrust laws of Florida, Kansas, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, New York, North
Carolina and Tennessee); In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 288 F.3d 1012, 1015
(7th Cir. 2002) ("No class action is proper unless all litigants are governed by the
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jurisdictional cases brought in Federal courts under state laws raise
significant conflict of law issues.' 62 Faced with a putative class action
on behalf of plaintiffs from several states arising under state law
indirect purchaser statutes, a federal judge must first determine which
state law governs. Some courts have declined to certify nationwide
classes where governing state laws vary.' 63 A principal concern of
these courts is the difficulty in instructing
a jury on applying varying
164
state laws to different plaintiffs.
Other courts, rejecting this per se approach to certification of
multi-state indirect purchaser actions, have afforded multi-state
plaintiffs the opportunity to make their case for certification.' 65 In
these cases, courts have paid close attention to state law requirements
of antitrust injury and whether such injury can be shown on a classwide basis.
Courts have rejected attempts to short-circuit the
conflict of law analysis by the simple expedient of invoking forum
law.167 Rather, the courts have focused on the situs of consumer
purchases in determining the governing law.168 States have a strong
interest in protecting consumers purchasing within the state.' On the
other hand, states have a weak interest
in applying their laws to sales
70
made to consumers in other states.1
The fact that the court concludes that the laws of several
different states will govern the indirect purchaser claims is not itself
fatal to certification.
The key question is whether the variations in
state law are significant enough to negate claims that common
same legal rules."); In re Am. Med. Sys., Inc., 75 F.3d 1069, 1085 (6th Cir. 1996)
(finding that it is "impossible" to instruct a jury where state laws differ); but see
Mowbray v. Waste Mgmt. Holdings, Inc., 189 F.R.D. 194, 202 (D. Mass. 1999)
(certifying class claims based on laws of different states).
162 Relafen Antitrust Litig., 221 F.R.D. at 276-279.
163

Bridgestone/Firestone,288 F.3d at 1015; Am. Med. Sys., 75 F.3d at 1085.

164

Am. Med. Sys., 75 F.3d at 1085.

165

Relafen Antitrust Litig., 221 F.R.D. at 278.

166

Id.at 280.

167

Id. at 276-77.

168

Id. at 277-78.

169

Id. at 278.

170

Relafen Antitrust Litig., 221 F.R.D. at 278; see also BMW of N. Am., Inc.

v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 571 (1996) ("[I]t is clear that no single state could...
impose its own policy choice on neighboring states.").
171 Relafen Antitrust Litig., 221 F.R.D. at 278.
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172

questions of law or fact predominate over individual questions.
Some courts have dealt with the conflict of laws problem by
simply assuming it away. For example, in In re Terazosin
Hydrochloride Antitrust Litigation,173 the court ruled that purported
variations in state indirect purchaser statutes created a false conflict
because plaintiffs "have cited case law under each state antitrust
statute interpreting the acts co-extensively with the federal antitrust
laws."' 174 What the court failed to explain was how state reliance on
federal precedent was relevant in indirect purchaser cases, given that
under the rule of Illinois Brick, indirect purchasers are barred from
recovery under federal law. 75 In addition, the court in Terazosin
minimized any issue of class-wide impact on the indirect purchaser
class, stating that "[c]ourts in the Eleventh Circuit have recognized a
presumption of [class-wide] impact properly arises in [overcharge]
cases where the defendants have market power
' 76 and are alleged to
have conspired with competing manufacturers."'
172

Id.

173

In re Terazosin Hydrochloride, 220 F.R.D. 672, 695 (S.D. Fla. 2004)

174 Id. at 695.
175

Id. at 695 n.38. The court recognized (recognizing that federal law did not

allow indirect purchaser claims).
176 Id. at 696-97. The court went on to say that even apart from the
presumption of class-wide impact, plaintiffs could establish antitrust impact by
showing:
(1) Hytrin and its AB-rated generic bioequivalents are interchangeable
versions of the same prescription drug product, with the exception that
the generic costs significantly less than the branded Hytrin; (2) generic
entry into the market results in consumers would switch to the lowerpriced alternative; (3) after Geneva launched its generic terazosin
capsule on August 13, 1999, the shares of sales accounted for by the
generic terazosin markedly increased, while the price of terazosin
decreased; (4) class members made payments for Hytrin at inflated
rates during the period of generic foreclosure, from 1995 through
August 12, 1999, which can be confirmed through generalized market
data; (5) class members could have obtained terazosin hydrochloride at
much lower prices absent the existence of the Abbot-Geneva and
Abbot-Zenith accords, and in the absence of Abbott's sham prosecution
of the add-on patents; and (6) Defendants used the same data and a
substantially similar methodology as that used by Indirect Purchaser
Plaintiffs here to forecast the economic effect of generic competition
for Hytrin. Other courts have found such generalized evidence of

impact to be sufficient for class certification purposes.
Terazosin Hydrochloride,220 F.R.D. at 697.
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Similarly, the court in In re Cardizem CD Antitrust
Litigation177 had no difficulty finding that the question of "cause in
fact" could be proved on a class-wide basis. 178 The court proceeded
to certify an indirect purchaser class consisting of end-users of the
prescription drug Cardizem, which had been sold to plaintiffs in a
form substantially unchanged from the form in which it was sold to
first purchasers. 79 The court in Cardizem
80 concluded that doubts
certification.'
of
favor
in
resolved
be
should
Conflict of laws, however, is not the only hurdle for plaintiffs
seeking class certification of state-based claims in federal court. The
decision in In re Methionine Antitrust Litigation181 is illustrative of
additional pitfalls faced by indirect purchasers in the certification
process in federal court, even in cases that involve the law of only
one state. In Methionine, the putative class of indirect purchasers
consisted of all natural persons and business entities in Wisconsin
who were indirect purchasers of methionine manufactured by
defendants. 182 The class purported to include both resellers and
end-users of methionine. 83Some putative class members purchased
methionine from direct purchasers or other intermediaries in pure
form.184 Others purchased products into which methionine
had been
85
incorporated for use in feed for livestock and pets.'
The court noted that the plaintiffs needed to prove three
elements in order to succeed on their antitrust claims: (1) a
conspiracy to fix prices in violation of the Wisconsin antitrust laws;
(2) class members were injured by the conspiracy; i.e., "fact of
damage" or "impact"; and (3) the amount of damages.' 86 The court
held that the second element-fact of damage--could not be proven
on a class-wide basis.' 87 As a threshold matter, the court identified
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In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 200 F.R.D. 326 (E.D. Mich. 2001).
Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 200 F.R.D. at 339-40.
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Id. at 332.

180

Id. at 334.
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In re Methionine Antitrust Litig., 204 F.R.D. 161 (N.D. Cal. 2001).
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Id. at 162.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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Methionine Antitrust Litig., 204 F.R.D. at 163.

187

Id. at 165.
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the problems of proof of injury by those indirect purchasers who
were also resellers, particularly those resellers who purchased pure
methionine and sold it as part of a "value added product."' 88 Resellers
would also have to prove that they absorbed some portion of the
overcharge; or, if they passed along 100% of the overcharge,89 that
they suffered some other form of injury, e.g., lost sales volume.'
The court observed that indirect purchaser plaintiffs have the
burden of proving whether and the extent to which alleged
overcharges were passed through the distribution chain. 19 In this
case, the Plaintiffs failed to prove their burden and therefore,
certification under Rule 23(b)(3) was denied. 191 It concluded that the
proof on this issue proffered by expert economist John M. Connor
was woefully short of the mark:
Connor's declaration does not come close to meeting this
burden. His declaration contains a brief, generic description
of how pass-through rates may be calculated for the
indirect purchasers:
Pass-through rates can be calculated with historical
data at the wholesale and retail levels. Because of the
lengthy class period, there should be plenty of data to
calculate [the pass-through rate] for the methionine
industry. Under the normal assumption of fixed
proportions in production (constant input/output
ratios) [the pass-through rate] is simply the observed
ratio of percentage change in purchase price of
methionine some months after 92a price change in the
wholesale price of methionine.1
The court found that the expert (1) failed to identify any
record evidence suggesting that his formula for determining passingon was appropriate for the methionine industry; (2) failed to provide
any method to show that a reseller who did pass-on overcharges had
been injured, nor did he show whether some or all any overcharges to
resellers had been passed-on by those resellers; and (3) failed to show
188

Id. at 164.

189

Id.

190

Id.

191

Methionine Antitrust Litig., 204 F.R.D. at 164.

192

Id.at 164-65.
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that any injury to indirect purchasers had occurred. 193 Accordingly,
injury in fact could not be proven
on a class-wide basis and common
94
predominate.'
not
did
questions
In addition, the court distinguished cases cited by the
plaintiffs where class certification had been granted. It noted that
those cases are inapposite because they involved plaintiffs who were
end-users and not resellers and the price-fixed product was sold in
substantially the same pure form and not incorporated into other
products. 195
Although the court did not specifically address the sufficiency
of the proffered expert testimony in Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals,Inc. 96 and its progeny, it might have reached the
same conclusion on the grounds that the expert testimony failed to
meet the standards prescribed in Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence. 197 The generic evidence of passing-on articulated by the
expert was at odds with the main facts and thus arguably lacked the
requisite "fit" needed to satisfy Rule 702.198 Although the factual
circumstances vary from case to case, it is likely that indirect
purchaser claims will face greater scrutiny at the outset under
Daubert.'99
193

Methionine Antitrust Litig., 204 F.R.D. at 165.
Id.

195

Id. at 165.

196

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).

197

FED. R. EVID. 702.

198

Id.

Id. Some courts have expressed reservations about making a "full
Daubert" hearing at the class certification stage. See Nichols v. SmithKline
199

Beecham Corp., 2003-1 Trade Cas. (CCH)

73, 974 (E.D. Pa. 2003) ("The issue

presently before the Court, however, is not whether each of the millions of sales of
Paxil to indirect purchasers during the proposed class period resulted in damage to
each individual indirect purchaser, but whether [the expert] has a sufficient basis
for opining that the class members suffered a common impact from Defendant's
alleged attempts to infinitely prolong its monopoly power in the market for
paraxetine hydro-chloride."); In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 200 F.R.D. 297,
307 (E.D. Mich. 2001) ("In order to show impact is susceptible to class-wide proof,
Plaintiffs are not required to show that the fact of injury actually exists for each
class member."); Midwestern Mach. v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 211 F.R.D. 562,
565-66 (D. Minn. 2001) ("The application of the Daubert test is somewhat limited
at the stage of class certification.").
Other courts have held that a Daubert inquiry is not inappropriate at the class
certification stage but that the bar is high. See In re Visa Check/MasterMoney

Illinois Brick

2004]

Still, judicial attitudes toward class action litigation vary
widely. The rules governing class actions in federal courts are
sufficiently fluid to give judges significant leeway in making class
certification decisions. In the end, a judge's attitude toward class
actions is likely to have a direct effect on the certification decision. z °
A court focusing on issues of commonality, typicality, and
predominance may be reluctant to certify class treatment for indirect
purchaser claims. z o l On the other hand, a court focusing on
efficiency
2 2
concerns may be inclined to certify the very same claims. 0
4. State Courts
As in the federal courts, class certification looms as a hurdle
to indirect purchaser suits in state courts. Decisions in the state courts
on the class certification issue, like those in the federal courts, have
been mixed. 2003 Professor Page suggests that the "most important
determinant of class certification of indirect purchaser suits appears
to be where the suit is filed., 20 4 Differing results on certification

Antitrust Litig., 192 F.R.D. 68, 76 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) ("To preclude [expert]
evidence at the class certification stage, it must be shown the opinion is the kind of
"junk science that a Daubert inquiry at this stage ought to screen."), aff'd, 280 F.3d
124 (2d Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 2382 (2002). Accord, In re Linerboard
Antitrust Litig., 203 F.R.D. 197 (E.D. Pa. 2001).
200 See Jerrold S. Solovy, Class Action Controversies,367 PLI/LIT. 473, 481
(Dec. 1, 1988) ("Variation in individual courts' attitudes toward class actions have
a direct impact on the outcome of the certification decision."); Natalie C. Scott,
Don't ForgetMe! The Client in a Class Action Lawsuit, 15 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHics
561, 588 (2002) ("Judicial attitudes often govern the treatment of class action
litigation and settlements."); In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 200 F.R.D. 326,
334 (E.D. Mich. 2001) (citing Little Caesar Enter., Inc. v. Smith, 172 F.R.D. 236,
241 (E. D. Mich. 1997)) (finding that courts should err on the side of certification).
201 See, e.g., Relafen Antitrust Litig., 221 F.R.D. at 276 (determining that
focusing on common economic harm may not be sufficient because some members
may not have this in common).
202 See, e.g., Bridgestone/Firestone,288 F.3d at 1015 (determining that it may
be more efficient to break down the plaintiff into different areas).
203 Compare Bellinder v. Microsoft Corp., 2001 WL 1397995 (Kan. Sept. 7,
2001) (granting certification), with A&M Supply Co. v. Microsoft Corp., 654
N.W.2d 572 (Mich. App. 2002) (denying certification of an indirect purchaser class
on virtually identical proof as submitted in Bellinder, including the same opposing
experts).
204 Page, supra note 62, at 21.
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rulings tend to reflect differences in state substantive law.
For
example, a District of Columbia court granted certification of an
indirect purchaser class after concluding that the D.C. statute
explicitly allows class-wide proof of injury.206 Other states have
denied certification where the state law in question, unlike D.C. law,
requires proof of injury to each class member. °7 Somewhat
surprising, at least at first blush, is the number of state court cases
where class certification has been denied to state law indirect
purchaser claims. 208 This is surprising in that indirect purchaser suits
specifically authorized by state statutes are thwarted by failure to
meet the requirements of a state-based class action. One might expect
the federal courts to look for ways to unload state indirect purchaser
claims, given the policies enunciated in Illinois Brick. Upon
reflection, the fact that indirect purchasers are encountering the same
procedural obstacles in state court as in federal court should not be
surprising at all. State and federal courts, applying similar legal
standards to similar facts, ought to come to similar results and it
would truly be surprising if they did not reach similar conclusions.
The fact that a significant number of state courts in states where
legislatures have authorized indirect purchaser suits have denied class
action treatment may, in the end, simply point out the wisdom of
205

Page, supra note 62, at 27.
206 Goda v. Abbott Labs., No. 01445-96, 1997 WL 156541 (D.C. Super. Ct.
1997).
207 See, e.g., Execu-Tech Bus. Sys., Inc. v. Appleton Papers, Inc., 743 So.2d

19 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (denying certification where plaintiffs had failed to
demonstrate a methodology using generalized proof to show that unlawful pricefixing affected each class member individually); Melnick v. Microsoft Corp., 2001
WL 1012261 (Me. Super. Ct. 2001) (denying certification where plaintiffs proffer
of "general, untried economic theory" instead of "real world facts" regarding injury
to Maine consumers failed to establish that overcharges were passed-on to endusers); A&M Supply, 252 Mich. App. at 616-32, 635 (denying certification where
plaintiffs failed to meet the "rigorous analysis" of adverse impact on individuals);
Gordon v. Microsoft Corp., 2001 WL 366432 (Minn. Dist. Ct. 2001) (granting
certification where plaintiffs proffered a viable method for proving class-wide
injury and amount of damages).
208 See, e.g., J.P. Morgan & Co. v. Superior Ct., 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d 214 (Ct. App.
2003) (denying certification of a nationwide class of indirect purchasers); OCE
Printing Sys. USA, Inc. v. Mailers Data Services, Inc., 760 So. 2d 1037 (Fla. Ct.
App. 2000) (denying class certification). For a comprehensive listing of state court
indirect purchaser cases where class certification has been denied, see Page, supra
note 62; Ronald W. Davis, Indirect PurchaserLitigation: ARC America's Chicken
Come Home to Roost on the Illinois Brick Wall, 65 ANTITRUST L.J. 375, 381 n.5

(1997).
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Compliance with rules governing class actions is only the tip
of the iceberg when one catalogues the potential problems with state
court indirect purchaser claims. Many of these actions seek
certification of nationwide classes in state court. Such cases raise
profound issues that go to the very heart of the power of state courts
to adjudicate matters in our federal system.2 0 9 As a threshold matter,
there is a serious question as to whether the requirement that common
questions of law or fact predominate over individual issues can ever
be met where plaintiffs are from many states with differing legal
standards for liability.2 10 More fundamentally, these cases raise
serious constitutional issues regarding the jurisdictional reach of state
courts, including whether the court has the power to speak the law
with respect to absentee class members having no connection with
the forum state and whether it is fair to proceed against defendants
whose conduct occurred principally outside the forum. 2 11 Equally
problematic is the issue of conflict of laws, specifically whether the
forum state has sufficient interest in the subject matter of the action
so that it is constitutional to apply forum law. 2 12 Lastly, state court
certification of nationwide classes creates the enormous practical
problems of "dueling jurisdictions" and possible multiple liability.
While state courts have not rejected arguments for
certification of nationwide classes out of hand, they have made clear
that these actions "should be certified only if it will provide
substantial benefit both to the courts and the litigants.' 2 13 It is also
clear that the bar setting the standard of proof is set high.
209

See John C. Anderson, Good "Brick" Walls Make Good Neighbors:

Should A State Court Certify a Multistate or Nationwide Class of Indirect

Purchasers,70 FORDHAM L. REv. 2019, 2031-32 (2002) (finding that a concern for
constitutional due process rights requires that before subjecting a defendant to the
substantive law of a given jurisdiction, that defendant must have some contact with
a state so as to avoid unfair surprise in the application of unfavorable substantive
law, and the nature of our federal system and the demands of the Full Faith and
Credit Clause inform us of a sovereign state's right to further the policies behind its
laws through application of those laws to disputes with which it has a significant
connection).
210 Bridgestone/Firestone,288 F.3d at 1015.
211

Relafen Antitrust Litig., 221 F.R.D. at 278.

Id.
213 J.P. Morgan & Co., Inc. v. Superior Ct., 113 Cal. App. 4th 195, 216
(2003)
214 Id. at 219 ("This showing by Plaintiff falls short of a clear demonstration
that the hundreds of thousands of proposed class members from states other than
212
213
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IV. Prescriptions
The theoretical debate over the relative merits of Illinois Brick
and Illinois Brick repealers continues; but, clearly, indirect purchaser
suits are not going away. The question is how best to deal with the
differing state and federal standards. Set forth below is a discussion
of possible ways to address this problem.
A. Substantive Approaches
1. Maintain the Status Quo
This is the most doctrinally pure position and perhaps the
most prudent. Yet, to ignore indirect purchaser suits and their
potential deleterious effects on the state and federal courts is to deny
a potentially devastating problem for the civil justice system.
Maintaining the status quo would mean that state indirect purchaser
suits would continue to percolate through the federal and state courts,
much as they do now. If nothing were done, these suits could become
millstones around the neck of the civil justice system, much in the
way Asbestos suits did in the 1980's and 1990's. Further inaction
may only fuel the problem.
2. Overrule Illinois Brick and Hanover Shoe
For reasons stated in Illinois Brick, this approach would have
a disastrous effect on the private antitrust remedy.215 At first blush,
this option might seem appealing. Turning the clock back would
serve to recognize compensation principles that had been bartered
away in favor of deterrence by Illinois Brick and Hanover Shoe. The
"benefit" of recognizing compensation principles, however, is
illusory because its price-overruling Hanover Shoe and thereby
California, who conducted their business in other states, nevertheless have brought
themselves within the protection of the California Cartwright Act.").
215 This solution is not politically feasible. See Gavil, supra note 148, at 880.
("After more than a quarter of century of acquiescence in Illinois Brick, however,
today it is hard to envision any political scenario that would lead to significant
expansion of the private right of action through alteration of the rule of Illinois
Brick. Quite to the contrary, there is probably more widespread acceptance of the
federal ban on indirect purchasers today than ever, and there is little reason to
believe that Congress might act to reauthorize indirect purchasers to sue in federal
court."). Similarly, any effort by Congress to preempt' state indirect purchaser suits
as suggested by ARCAmerica is likely to be without support. Id.
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reactivating the passing-on defense-is unacceptably high. Were
Hanover Shoe overruled, plaintiffs, especially first purchasers in the
distribution chain, would have little incentive to sue because, after
spending time, effort and money to uncover and investigate
wrongdoing and thereafter prove liability, they could not fully reap
the fruits of the treble damage remedy, if some or all of the
overcharges incurred may have been passed-on to customers.
Whether or not passing-on, in fact, occurred in a given case, the issue
would likely be raised in all cases, imposing significant costs on
direct purchasers and adding a new dimension of risk to an already
risky enterprise. These factors combine to create enormous
disincentives for indirect purchasers to sue. If direct purchasers bow
out, there is little hope of identifying an effective plaintiff because, as
we work our way down the distribution chain, the monetary
incentives to sue decrease while the difficulties in proof increase
exponentially. The cost of overruling Hanover Shoe in terms of
reduced incentives to sue and diminution in deterrence is simply not
worth the benefit of having end-users compensated for passed-on
overcharges.
3. Overrule Illinois Brick but not Hanover Shoe
This approach was specifically rejected by the Supreme Court
in Illinois Brick, which insisted on symmetrical treatment of the
passing-on issue. The Supreme Court was concerned that under this
approach, defendants may be subjected to multiple liability, since
Hanover Shoe holds unequivocally that first purchasers are entitled to
recover 100% of any overcharge, irrespective of whether the first
purchasers actually passed-on some or all of the illegal overcharges
imposed on them by the conspirators.
Notwithstanding Justice White's forceful and persuasive
argument that the passing-on issue in HanoverShoe and Illinois Brick
must be treated symmetrically, the argument for an asymmetrical
approach may have legs. The antitrust enforcement experience in the
nearly three decades since the Illinois Brick ruling suggests that the
concerns about multiple liability cited by the Illinois Brick majority
might be overblown. The federal courts today seem less concerned
about multiple liability and appear to have no problem in exacting
large criminal fines on top of civil treble damage awards, which is
arguably the functional equivalent of "paying twice." For example, in
the Vitamins Case, Hoffman-LaRoche paid a record criminal fine of
$500 million and thereafter made, and continues to make, payments
in large amount to plaintiffs in settlement of private treble damages
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216

actions.
In theory, forcing defendants to compensate indirect
purchasers, after first purchasers have been awarded 100% of any
overcharges under Hanover Shoe, is no different from imposing
criminal fines in addition to treble damage judgments. What some
would call multiple liability, others would call maximization of
deterrence and compensation. At the same time, concerns about
multiple liability are not frivolous. If this asymmetrical approach
were adopted, concerns about multiple liability could be ameliorated
by limiting indirect purchasers to actual damages.
4. Permit State Attorneys General to Sue on Behalf of
Indirect Purchasers
A variation of the foregoing alternative would be to permit
suits on behalf of indirect purchaser by state attorneys general but not
by private parties. This would ensure that indirect purchaser suits are
brought in the public interest, and not in the private interest of
plaintiffs' class action lawyers. More importantly, this approach
would be in line with what was intended by Hart-Scott-Rodino but
undone by Illinois Brick. As previously noted, Hart-Scott-Rodino
authorized state attorneys general to sue parenspatriae on behalf of
natural persons victimized by price-fixing. 21 7 While this approach
would limit the number of indirect purchaser suits and minimize the
potential for multiple liability, it does not address the more
fundamental problem of tracing overcharges through the distribution
chain.
B. Procedural Approach
Rather than amend substantive antitrust law, Congress may
choose to address the problems created by Illinois Brick through
procedural reforms which would authorize federal jurisdiction over
multi-jurisdictional indirect purchaser suits brought in state court.
From an efficiency perspective, what is needed is a mechanism to get
all antitrust actions-state and federal-arising from a common
nucleus of operative fact, including both direct purchaser and indirect
purchaser suits, before a single federal judge. This path would
eliminate multi-jurisdictional suits, as well as the extra cost and delay
associated with such suits, facilitate universal settlements and provide
216 See Vitamins Antitrust Litig., 305 F.Supp.2d at 100 (approving settlements

with Biotin and Niacin defendants).
217 15 U.S.C. § 15c (2000); see supra text accompanying note 85.
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disincentives for strategic behavior by erstwhile state court indirect
purchaser plaintiffs. It would also assure consistency in judgments
and minimize potential multiple liability, while at the same time
assuring that no antitrust claimant would be unfairly prejudiced. The
goal here is to make sure that multi-jurisdictional indirect purchase
suits do not inundate the civil justice system the way asbestos cases
did in the 1980's and 1990's.
The Class Action Fairness Act of 2003,218 currently before the
Senate and passed by the House during the first session of the 108th
Congress, is designed to address the potentially adverse impact of
multi-jurisdictional lawsuits on the civil justice system. The Act lists
a series of legislative findings detailing the abuses which have crept
into interstate class actions such as: the use of artful pleading by
plaintiffs attorneys to avoid litigating class actions in state court; how
the respective abuses undermine the federal judicial system, the free
flow of goods in interstate commerce and the intent of the drafters of
the Constitution in creating diversity jurisdiction; and how abusive
interstate class actions in state courts have harmed society as a whole
because unjustified awards are made to some class members at the
expense of others. 219 Such examples of societal harm include:
(1)The use of artful pleading by plaintiffs' attorneys to
avoid litigating class actions in a federal forum, thereby
making business entities defend interstate class actions in
state court, wherein (a) lawyers, not plaintiffs, are the
principal beneficiaries of the lawsuits; (b) less scrutiny is
given to cases that would be given in federal court; and (c)
defendants, facing potentially enormous liability, have no
choice but enter into settlement
agreements, irrespective of
220
the merits of the claim.
(2)These abuses undermine the federal judicial system, the
free flow of goods in interstate commerce and intent of the
drafters of the Constitution in creating diversity jurisdiction
218

Three bills carry the title of Class Action Fairness Act of 2003. H.R. 1115

was passed by the House in the first session of the 108th Congress. S. 274 was
introduced in the first session of the 108th Congress and not passed. S. 1751 was
also introduced in the first session of the 108th Congress and is currently to be
debated by the Senate. The bills are substantially similar in content. The discussion
here references S. 1751, 108th Cong. (2003).
219 S. 1751, 108th Cong. (2003).
220 S. 1751, 108th Cong. § 2(2) (2003).
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in that state courts are (a) hearing interstate class actions
affecting parties from numerous states; (b) sometimes
acting with bias against out of state defendants; and (c)
entering judgments which bind out of state residents and
impose their particular view of the law on other states.22 '
(3)Abusive interstate class actions in state courts have
harmed society as a whole because unjustified awards are
made to some
class members at the expense of other class
222
members.
The legislation would address these abuses by expanding
federal subject matter jurisdiction to include class action suits where
the amount in controversy exceeds $5 million and minimal diversity
exists. 223 Thus, minimal diversity would exist where (1) any member
of the plaintiffs' class is a citizen of a state different from the
defendant; (2) any member of the plaintiffs' class is a foreign state or
a citizen of a foreign state and defendant is a citizen of a state; or (3)
any member of the plaintiffs' class is a citizen of a state and any
defendant is a foreign state or a citizen of a foreign state.224 In
determining whether the $5 million amount in controversy has been
met, the plaintiffs' claims may be aggregated,225 thereby eliminating
the Zahn problem discussed above.
The legislation would, however, exclude federal subject
matter jurisdiction where (1) at least two-thirds of the plaintiffs are
citizens of the state in which the action is filed; (2) at least one
defendant from whom significant relief is sought and whose conduct
forms a significant basis for class claims is a citizen of the state in
which the claim is filed; and (3) the principal injuries caused by
defendants' conduct were incurred in the state where the action was
initially filed.227
In addition, federal courts under this legislation may "in the
221

S. 1751, 108th Cong. § 2(4) (2003). See S. Rep. No. 108-23 at 14-23

(2003) (providing a detailed discussion of abuses arising from multijurisdictional
class actions).
222 S. 1751, 108th Cong. §
2(c) (2003).
223

S.1751, 108th Cong. § 4(a)(2) (2003).

224

Id.

225

Id.
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See infra Part III.A.3.
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S. 1751, 108th Cong. § 4(a)(4) (2003).

Illinois Brick

2004]

interests of justice and looking at the totality of the circumstances"
decline jurisdiction where between one-third and two-thirds of the
plaintiffs' class and the primary defendants are citizens of the state in
which the action is filed initially. 22 8 In making that decision, Courts
are directed to consider the following factors:
(a) whether the claims asserted involve matters of national
or interstate interest;
(b) whether the claims asserted will be governed by laws of
the State in which the action was originally filed or by the
laws of other States;
(c) whether the class action has been pleaded in a manner
that seeks to avoid Federal jurisdiction;
(d) whether the action was brought in a forum with a
distinct nexus with the class members, the alleged harm, or
the defendants;
(e) whether the number of citizens of the State in which the
action was originally filed in all proposed plaintiff classes
in the aggregate is substantially larger than the number of
citizens from any other State, and the citizenship of the
other members of the proposed class is dispersed among a
substantial number of States; and
(f)whether, during the three-year period preceding the
filing of that class action, one or more other class actions
asserting the same or similar claims on behalf of the same
or other person have been filed.229
While a step in the right direction, this legislation is not
sufficiently comprehensive to resolve the problems created by
indirect purchaser suits under state antitrust law. The expansion of
diversity jurisdiction to permit federal jurisdiction over class actions
by indirect purchasers is both appropriate and necessary but may be
largely undone through artful pleading because of a huge loophole
228

S. 1751, 108th Cong. § 4(a)(3) (2003).

229

Id.
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that in some cases requires, and in other cases permits, federal courts
to decline adjudicatory authority. 230 One might try to minimize this
argument by pointing out that problematic indirect purchaser claims
typically arise out of cases involving national or international
antitrust conspiracies, and accordingly the exceptions are unlikely to
arise in the antitrust context. Still, the legislation as currently drafted
gives calculating plaintiffs' counsel sufficient wiggle room to
frustrate Congress and the courts. Moreover, the legislation does not
address the problem of disparate treatment of class action
certification by the federal courts. Nor does the legislation, as it
should, empower the Judicial Panel for Multi-district Litigation to
consolidate all cases-state and federal-before one court for both
trial and pretrial purposes. 23 1 Finally, it is not clear whether the $5
million threshold for jurisdiction takes into account trebling; if not,
then the threshold should be lower.

V. Lessons Learned
A. Indirect Purchaser Suits
In the quarter century since the Illinois Brick decision, the
antitrust community has learned some very important lessons.
Foremost among them is that the Supreme Court was on target in
ruling that allowing indirect purchasers to sue would complicate and
delay antitrust proceedings. Today, notwithstanding technological
developments that have given birth to sophisticated econometric
models predicting economic behavior, there is still no satisfactory
way to trace overcharges through the distribution chain without
resorting to assumptions and outright speculation. Adding indirect
purchasers to the mix makes both the settlement process and trial-if
the matter ever reaches trial-infinitely more complex. Nor are
existing procedural mechanisms designed to get parties before a
single fact-finder effective. Moreover, contrary to what critics of
Illinois Brick have maintained, direct purchasers do sue pricefixers. 232 Robust enforcement activities by direct purchasers in the
230

See S. 1751, 108th Cong. § 4(a)(4) (2003).

231

See Lexecon, Inc. v. Milberg, Weiss, Bershad, Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S.

26 (1998) (holding that 28 U.S.C. § 1407 does not authorize a transferee court to
retain the case for trial purposes).
232 See Report of the American Bar Association Antitrust Section Task Force
to Review ProposedLegislation to Repeal or Modify Illinois Brick, 52

ANTITRUST

2004]

Illinois Brick

past decade belie any contention that Illinois Brick has had a negative
impact on deterrence.2 33 Finally, it remains unclear whether indirect
purchaser suits are truly in the interest of the client and not the
attorney.
At the same time, the post Illinois Brick experience has debunked certain myths about indirect purchaser suits. Indirect
purchaser suits have not bankrupted any Fortune 500 companies; it is
clear that firms which have violated the antitrust laws can survive,
and perhaps even thrive, after compensating indirect purchasers.
Indirect purchaser suits have led to a modest up-tick in deterrence. It
also appears that consumers, at least in actions brought by state
governments, are getting some compensation from antitrust
violators.234 While the indirect purchaser suits have not proven to be
the scourge that some had predicted, they have been problematic and
disruptive in both federal and state courts; and clearly the case has
not been made for overruling or even modifying the Illinois Brick
rule. Finally, the ultimate irony is that the best hope for resolving the
procedural nightmare created by multi-jurisdictional indirect
purchaser suits is to remove those cases to federal court-the very
place the Supreme Court said should not be hearing such claims in
the first place.
B. Implications of Illinois BriCk for the Broader Question of the
Proper Role of States in Antitrust Enforcement
Illinois Brick and ARC America were defining moments for
state antitrust enforcement. Illinois Brick galvanized state legislatures
into action to find a way around the direct purchaser rule. ARC
America helped to jump start enforcement of state-created indirect
purchaser statutes in both state and federal courts, and in the wake of
that decision, states have carved out an enforcement niche in indirect
purchaser suits arising under state law.
These decisions, however, did more than simply fill an
enforcement void; they emboldened state regulators to pursue
ambitious enforcement agendas that parallel those of the federal
agencies, including price-fixing, bid rigging, resale price
maintenance, and mergers. Indeed, the proper role of state regulators
and state courts in the overall antitrust enforcement picture has
L.J. 841 (1984).
233 See Vitamins Antitrust Litig., 305 F. Supp. 2d at 100.
234

See Boyle v. Giral, 820 A.2d 561 (D.C. 2003) (awarding antitrust action

for indirect purchasers).
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become a topic of heated debate. Judge Richard Posner, over a
decade after ARC America was handed down, proposed virtual
elimination of state antitrust enforcement and of state antitrust
laws. 235 Defenders of state antitrust enforcement, notably Professor
Harry First, argue that although "[flitting somewhat uncomfortably
into this dual system" of public and private enforcement of federal
antitrust law, state antitrust enforcement remains vital to the
protection of consumer interests. 236 Professor First notes that in
obtaining recoveries parenspatriae on behalf of injured citizens, "the
states in no way conflict with federal enforcement., 237 Professor First
further argues that states can bring meaningful value added to
antitrust enforcement in those local cases where "a state enforcement
agency can more easily8 understand the market" and thus more likely
to benefit consumers.
How should the balance between state and federal antitrust
enforcement be struck? Here, Illinois Brick can teach some valuable
lessons. First, it is far too late in the game to turn back the clock and
largely eliminate state antitrust enforcement as Judge Posner
proposes.. Second, state enforcement works best where its
supplements, rather than duplicates, federal enforcement efforts.
Professor First is correct that state enforcement can complement
federal enforcement, notably in parens patriae cases on behalf of
consumers. States might also take the lead in resale price
maintenance cases, which appear to be low on the list of federal
enforcement priorities. Federal regulators might consider handing
over bid rigging cases to state authorities so that federal personnel
can be devoted to resource-intensive national and international cartel
cases. States should go forward with price-fixing cases which, either
because of their size or peculiar local characteristics, have flown
under the federal radar.
Even under Professor First's "value added" approach,
however, it is hard to make a case for having states play a lead role in
merger enforcement for two reasons. First, time is of the essence in
most mergers. The time value of money and market expectations
235 Richard A. Posner, Antitrust in the New Economy, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 925,

940-42 (2001).
236 Harry First, Delivering Remedies: The Role of the States in Antitrust

Enforcement, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1004 (2001).
237 Id. at 1039.

238 Id. at 1036 (finding that this value added approach "does not make for a
neat division of responsibility between state and federal enforcers").
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make it critical that the merger, if lawful, proceed expeditiously. The
Hart-Scott-Rodino process gives federal authorities ample time to
scrutinize the merger. Forcing the merging parties to jump through
additional hoops with the states can further delay the transaction.
Generally, these costs would appear to outweigh the marginal
benefits from state involvement. Absent a compelling state interest,
state authorities should defer to the federal government on merger
issues.
Second, requiring mergers to pass muster with federal and
state regulators may create confusion and uncertainty for foreign
firms engaged in international transactions. The need for United
States antitrust enforcers to speak with one voice grows more
compelling as the economy becomes more globalized. The prospect
of having to obtain the approval of not only the federal government,
but also one, some, or all of the fifty states, would prove
overwhelming and also quite costly to foreign firms attempting to
consummate a cross-border merger. While cooperation between
federal and state antitrust enforcers has improved markedly in the
merger area, turf battles continue to be fought. The federal
government continues to be the senior partner in cooperative
enforcement ventures, and that is how things should be.

VI. Conclusion
In Illinois Brick, the Supreme Court held that the policy of
containing antitrust litigation trumped an indirect purchaser's right to
prove injury from price-fixing on the merits. In the wake of the
migration of indirect purchaser suits to state court, the debate has
shifted away from substantive law to procedural remedies. It is now
up to Congress to fashion procedures that will provide for the just,
speedy, and efficient resolution of multi-jurisdictional indirect
purchaser suits. Failure to address this issue will have dire
consequences for the civil justice system in the United States.

